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INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT PREDICAMENT

The relationship of the antitrust laws to the patent, copyright and
other intellectual property laws has perplexed antitrust scholars and
practitioners since the beginning of the twentieth century.' The problems
I. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917),
overruling, Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912). For thoughtful recent discussions of the
relationships between the antitrust laws and the intellectual property laws, see generally, Michael A.
Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761 (2002); David
McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485
(1999); Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1133 (2000). Professor Carrier has proposed that the application of antitrust and patent law be
determined in each case partly upon the relative importance to innovation in the affected market of
competition or patents, a determination that would be made through a series of presumptions,
rebuttals and surrebuttals. Professor Patterson has proposed reconciling antitrust and intellectual
property laws (including both patents and copyrights) by distinguishing between the protected
invention or expression and the products in which those inventions or expressions are embodied.
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in reconciling the two legal areas arise from two, if related, sources. One
problem lies in their purposes: the intellectual property laws are
designed to create exclusive rights-exclusive rights that sometimes rise
to the level of monopolies-in order to encourage innovation and
creativity. The antitrust laws are designed to foster competition and to
prevent the formation of monopolies. The other related problem is
definitional; just how far does the protection afforded by these laws
extend? To a large extent the answer to the second question depends on
how we approach reconciling the purposes of these laws.
Recent decisions by the Federal Circuit in In re Independent
Service OrganizationsAntitrust Litigation,' the Ninth Circuit in Image
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,3 and the D.C. Circuit in
the Microsoft antitrust litigation4 are contributing to a new understanding
of the relationship between the two sets of laws. In their Antitrust
Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intellectual Property'-issuedin 1995the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have shown
their keen awareness of the challenges that intellectual property poses
for antitrust law. Recent judicial decisions involving misuse doctrines,
such as the Fifth Circuit's Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,6
have also dealt with the tensions between intellectual property protection
and competition. These several judicial decisions and enforcement
agency pronouncements emphasize different aspects of the scope and
limitations of intellectual property rights and their role in the
marketplace. As a result, the law may appear to some observers as
confusing and incoherent. Yet this superficial conflict and inconsistency
in the cases may be more apparent than real. In any event, it is
symptomatic of the development of a new intellectual property/antitrust
paradigm,7 a paradigm which has been emerging for some time and
which is now close to widespread acceptance.
When, if ever, does the exercise of rights under the patent and
copyright laws violate the antitrust laws? To what extent can the
exploitation of power conferred by the intellectual property laws
constitute monopolization or attempted monopolization? When can the
The proposal made in this Article avoids the difficulties of both of the above proposals, because the
proposal made here merely requires the courts to recognize the rational themes already present in its
caselaw and to follow them consistently.
2. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
3. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
4. See generally United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
5. See 68 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1708 (Supp. 1995).
6. 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
7.

See generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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exploitation of that power violate section one of the Sherman Act? Or
section three of the Clayton Act? To what extent can patent or copyright
misuse doctrines constrain behavior which does not violate the antitrust
laws? To what extent, if at all, can the courts be expected to guide their
development of the copyright misuse doctrine by legislatively-imposed
limitations on the patent misuse doctrine? The courts have taken
different approaches to the relative primacy of the patent and copyright
laws over the antitrust laws. Some courts believe that antitrust laws
severely constrain rights conferred by the patent and copyright laws.
Over the past century the courts have incorporated competition policies
into the patent laws themselves and during the past decade the courts
have taken a similar approach with the copyright laws. Because the
courts have not always outlined the boundaries of the antitrust laws and
the intellectual property laws with precision and because their
interjection of competition policies into the intellectual property law has
not been guided by a coherent economic rationale, a cloudy penumbra of
prohibited behavior has hung over the patent and copyright laws.
This Article examines the interplay of antitrust law, patent law,
copyright law, and the patent and copyright misuse doctrines, as they
have evolved over time and in their present state of flux. It reviews some
of the academic commentary directed at the antitrust/intellectual
property interface. It then presents a new way of looking at the problems
posed by the social need for innovation and it reveals the inadequacy of
a significant amount of the existing caselaw. The Article outlines a new
paradigm governing the relationship between competition and
intellectual property policies.
I start in Part II with a brief outline of the interactions between the
courts and the Congress involving tying and the intellectual property
laws. In that history, antitrust concepts have entered patent law in
different ways: Sometimes they have been absorbed, more or less
directly, into patent law. Sometimes they have entered patent law
through the patent misuse doctrine. Part III tracks the evolution of patent
misuse and antitrust law during the first six decades of the twentieth
century. Part IV treats the Chicago-school reaction to the earlier law, as
manifested in academic journals, the courts, and the Congress. Part V
examines some academic critiques of the current state of the
antitrust/intellectual property interface. Parts VI through VIII review the
recent rebirth and evolution of the copyright misuse doctrine. Part IX
explores recent antitrust developments in the intellectual property arena.
Part X then describes a newly emerging judicial synthesis of antitrust
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and intellectual property policies. Part XI explores connections between
the new synthesis and academic commentary.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CONGRESS
AND THE COURTS ON TYING ARRANGEMENTS

When Congress, in 1890, enacted the Sherman Act and thus
embraced competition as a national policy, it may not have directly
focused upon the relationship between competition and intellectual
property rights. Although the Sherman Act was cast in language that is
both sweeping and imprecise, broad outlines of a judicial approach to its
construction were becoming increasingly visible in the first decade and
one-half of the twentieth century. In 1911, the Supreme Court had
embraced the so-called "rule of reason," 9 an interpretative technique
which examined behavior contextually. During this early period the
courts were also taking an expansive approach to the powers of patent
holders. In 1912, the Court had upheld, as incident to its patent rights,
the marketing practice of a seller of mimeograph machines under which
users were required to obtain their supplies of ink and paper from that
seller.' ° Yet while the courts were tilting towards the rights of patent
holders, the Justice Department was simultaneously launching an attack,
under the Sherman Act, on the United Shoe Machinery Company's
practices of tying together leases of its various types of patented shoe
manufacturing machinery." Under that company's practices, lessees of
any one or more of its machines became bound to lease all of their
machinery from that company.
In 1914, the Congress responded to the judicial developments of
both the antitrust and patent law. In part reacting to the Supreme Court's
rule-of-reason approach to the Sherman Act, the Congress enacted
several antitrust provisions in the Clayton Act which were targeted at
specific types of problematic behavior. The Clayton Act contains
provisions directed against price discrimination,' 2 against tying
arrangements,' 3 against stock acquisitions,'4 and against interlocking
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
9. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62-68 (1911); United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911).
10. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912).
11. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 222 F. 349, 396 (D. Mass. 1915), affd, 247
U.S. 32 (1918); United States v. Winslow, 195 F. 578, 586 (D. Mass. 1912), aff'd, 227 U.S.
202 (1913).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
13. See id. § 14.
14. See id. § 18.
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directorates." Congress attempted to express its disapproval of the use of
patents as aids for imposing tying arrangements when it enacted section
three of the Clayton Act. 6 Section three not only forbade tying one
commodity to another when anticompetitive effects are likely to result, 7
but its prohibition was extended to the tying of both patented and
unpatented commodities. The legislative history of section three
contains numerous disapproving references to the tying practices of the
A.B. Dick Company, which the Court had recently approved,'9 and to the
tying practices of the United Shoe Machinery Company, which the
government was then attacking under the Sherman Act. Apparently
Congress wanted its prohibition to be unaffected by the fact that a tying
arrangement-like those of United Shoe Machinery-involved patented
products.2 °
The Supreme Court responded to the Clayton Act by overruling the
decision in A.B. Dick Company that had held that a patentee could
lawfully condition the use of a patented machine on the use of supplies
purchased from the patentee.2' And, in a series of cases,22 the Court

15. See id. § 19.
16. See id. § 14.
17. Section three provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contact for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,
consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of
Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United
States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on
the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale,
or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id.
18. See id.
19. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
20. This method of statement omits the problems which were created when the courts ruled
that a firm would be deemed to violate the Clayton Act when it possessed market power in the
market for the tying product and then inferred market power from the existence of a patent or other
intellectual property right. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) ("The requisite
economic power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted."). Under the
amendment to section 27 1(d), market power is no longer inferred from the existence of a patent for
misuse analysis. Behavior which does not rise to the level of misuse would appear unlikely to be
ruled in violation of the antitrust laws. Even before the amendment of section 271 (d), the courts had
often refused to equate a patent with market power. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc.,
806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986); USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir.
1982); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
21. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518-19 (1917).
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gradually expanded the constraints on tying by patentees. By midcentury, the Court had so expanded those constraints that they had
undermined the doctrine of contributory infringement. Congress
responded legislatively in the Patent Act of 1952 ("Patent Act") by
reinstating the contributory infringement doctrine and limiting the scope
of the misuse doctrine. This legislation did not inhibit the judicial assault
on tying arrangements, however. The assault merely shifted to another
front. Thereafter, the Court expanded its attacks on tying arrangements
of all kinds. The Court singled out tying connected with patents and
copyrights, however, by attributing a presumption of market power to
these intellectual property rights.23 Since the Court had also adopted a
per se rule condemning tying arrangements whenever the seller
possessed market power, the effect of this presumption was to make all
tying arrangements entered into by holders of patents or copyrights per
se illegal.
During the last two decades of the past century, the foundation for
any such presumption has been substantially eroded. The Court plurality
referred to that presumption in Jefferson Parish4 and a Court majority
referred to it again in Eastman Kodak.25 But Jefferson Parish also
generated a four-Justice concurring opinion in which the presumption
was rejected. 26 Legal commentators have shown the presumption to be
without basis in fact since the legal monopoly of a patent is not
necessarily coextensive with an economic monopoly. 27 Lower courts
(albeit not unanimously) have agreed;" they have refused to apply any
such presumption in monopolization and attempt cases,29 and have even
refused to apply the presumption in the tying context where it had been
initially raised.30 Legislation enacted in 1988 rejected any such

22.

See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680

(1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931);
Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. 502. These cases are discussed, infra, Part 11.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45; see infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984).
See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480 n.29 (1992).
See 466 U.S. at 37 n.7.
See William Montgomery, Note, The Presumption of Economic Powerfor Patented and

Copyrighted Products in Tying Arrangements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1150-51 (1985).

28. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).
29. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. See A.l. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1986); F.B.
Leopold Co. v. Roberts Filter Mfg. Co., 882 F. Supp. 433, 454 (W.D. Pa. 1995); Klo-Zik Co. v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 677 F. Supp. 499, 505 (E.D. Tex. 1987); see also Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l
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presumption for purposes of patent misuse.3' Finally, recent cases have
turned the presumption on its head by holding that a patent (or
copyright) may justify a tie that would otherwise be invalid." As a result
of all of these events, it no longer appears that the conjunction of a
patent or copyright with a tie automatically results in an antitrust
violation.33 Moreover, the courts have become significantly less hostile
to tying agreements in general. Indeed, in Jefferson Parish,four Justices
of the Supreme Court argued for the abolition of the per se rule against
tying. This strain of Jefferson Parish has apparently been picked up by
the D.C. Circuit which, in its recent Microsoft decision, rejected the per
se rule and opted for the rule of reason for the evaluation of tying
arrangements involving "platform software., 34 Yet public policy remains
murky. The Court majority in Jefferson Parishruled that tying offended
the antitrust laws because it facilitated price discrimination,35 behavior
which may well increase output and reduce allocative inefficiencies.36
And in Eastman Kodak, the Court ruled that a manufacturer's refusal to
sell parts to an independent servicing organization that wanted to
compete in the service aftermarket with the manufacturer could
constitute an unlawful tie violating section one of the Sherman Act as
well as monopolization in violation of section two. 37 Congress amended
the Patent Act in the late 1980s to further constrain judicial attempts to
apply the misuse doctrine.38 Yet, even as it was exerting control over the
misuse doctrine, Congress failed to enact proposed accompanying
provisions that would have protected patentees from assaults under the
antitrust laws. And in the 1990s, the courts have fostered the copyright
misuse doctrine, a doctrine ostensibly based on the patent misuse
doctrine, to limit the ability of copyright holders to engage in a variety
of tying arrangements.

Bus. Machs. Corp., 693 F. Supp. 262, 281 (E.D. Pa. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 33 F.3d 194
(3d Cir. 1994).
31. See Pub. L. 100-703, Title II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
32. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1328-29.
33. See id.
34. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
35. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14-15 (1984).
36. See id. at 36 n.4 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992). The
Court remanded the case for trial on the issue of whether competition in the equipment market
disciplined the aftermarkets so that all three markets (equipment, parts, and servicing) manifested
competitive behavior. See id.
38. See Pub. L.100-703, Title II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4676 (1988) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
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III.

PROPERTY INTERFACE

PATENT LICENSING POWER, MISUSE, INFRINGEMENT,
AND ANTITRUST

A. The Early Twentieth Century: From UnconstrainedPatent
Leveraging to the Clayton Act to the Misuse Doctrine to the
Mercoid Cases
Early patent cases involving issues of contributory infringement
provide a useful framework in which to examine the interplay between
antitrust and patent law. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine
Co.," arose during the period in which the Victor company held a patent
on the phonograph. 4° The Leeds & Catlin firm was manufacturing and
selling records for playing on the Victor phonograph. 4' Ruling that the
invention covered by the patent was composed of the combination of "a
travelling tablet having a sound recording formed thereon" and "a
reproducing stylus," the Court ruled that placing the record on the
phonograph was a "reconstruction" of the patented invention, something
which only the patent holder had a right to do.42 Accordingly,
phonograph owners committed acts of direct infringement when they
placed non-Victor records on their machines. And the suppliers of those
records, such as Leeds & Catlin, were contributory infringers. In Leeds
& Catlin, the Court distinguished an earlier case, Morgan Envelope Co.
v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co.,43 which involved a supplier
of paper for use with a patented dispenser.44 In that case the claim of
contributory infringement had been rejected. 45 The distinction, according
to the Court, was that the earlier case involved merely the replenishment
of inert perishable supplies which the mechanism was designed to
deliver whereas in Leeds & Catlin the records were perceived by the
of the invention "co-act[ing] with the stylus
Court as an active ingredient
4 6
to produce the result.
A decade before Leeds & Catlin, the Sixth Circuit had expansively
construed the rights of a patent holder in Heaton-PeninsularButtonFastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. ' There, the holder of a patent on a
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

213 U.S. 325 (1909).
See id. at 331.
See id.
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 311 (1909).
152 U.S. 425 (1894).
See id. at 427.
See id. at 436.
213 U.S. at 335.
77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
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button-fastener machine used limited licensing to require the first and all
subsequent purchasers of the machine to obtain their staples from the
patentee. Although normally, purchasers of patented machines acquire a
general license to use them as they see fit, the court ruled that the
patentee could sell patented machines under a limited license
(transferable to subsequent purchasers) restricting the uses to which
purchasers could put the machines. In this case, the patentee restricted
the license to use of the machines with staples supplied by the patentee
itself. Use of the machine with staples from another source exceeded the
terms of the limited license and therefore constituted infringement. s
The Sixth Circuit was clear that the staples were not part of the
invention (as were the phonograph records in Leeds & Catlin). The
infringement here consisted not of a reconstruction of the machine, but
merely of unlicensed use. Since the defendant supplied staples knowing
that the owners of the machine intended to use them in acts of direct
infringement, the defendant was itself a contributory infringer. 49 The
theory underlying Heaton-Peninsularappears at odds with the ruling in
Morgan Envelope where the defendant prevailed because the invention
contemplated the periodic replenishment of supplies. ° In Morgan
Envelope, the Court took the view that either the paper was not part of
the invention or that, if it were, the inventor necessarily consented to the
purchaser's use of supplies obtained from an independent source.5' If
there were doubts about the correctness of the Sixth Circuit's decision,
these largely vanished in 1912 when the Supreme Court confirmed the
Heaton-Peninsularapproach in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.52 In the latter
case, the seller of a patented mimeograph machine sold it under a license
authorizing its use only with stencil paper, ink and other supplies made
by the patentee.5 3 Relying in significant part upon the language of the
Patent Act which confers an exclusive right over "use," the Court held
the patentee to be acting within the rights conferred by the patent law:.
48. See id. at 290-91, 296-97, 300.
49. See id. at 289, 296-97.
50. See Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425,
433 (1894).
51. See id. at 431.
52. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
53. See id. at ll.
54. See id. at 25-26, 46. The Court distinguished an earlier case involving an attempt by a
copyright holder to control the price at which its book could be sold at retail. In Bobbs-Merrill Co.
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), the Court had ruled that the Copyright Act did not confer power in
the copyright holder to control the prices at which subsequent purchasers sold a book. The "firstsale" doctrine which the Court applied in Bobbs-Merrill is currently incorporated in section 109 of
the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994). Because the patent law conferred a right of
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In 1917, five years after its decision in A.B. Dick, the Court
switched its position 180 degrees. In Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Manufacturing Co.," the plaintiff owned the patent on a
device for feeding film into motion picture projectors. The plaintiff
patentee sought to limit the film used with its device by following the
strategy of attaching a limited license to the machines. This time the
Court rejected the patentee's attempt to control the supplies used with its
patented machine, disapproving of Heaton-Peninsularand overruling
A.B. Dick." In its Motion Picture Patents decision, the Court took note
of the then-recently enacted Clayton Act, 7 observing that its section
three was directed against tying arrangements whether the goods
involved were patented or unpatented.5 Although the Court did not
apply that provision, it recognized it as expressing a public policy
against tying arrangements and followed that policy.59
This revised position found expression again in 1931 in Carbice
Corp. of America v. American Patents Development Corp.60 where it was
expanded to the very edges of the Court's earlier Leeds & Catlin ruling.
Indeed, Carbice is the link between the Motion Picture Patents ruling
that a patentee of a machine lacks power to control the use of supplies
with 61that machine and the Court's expansive holding in the Mercoid
cases in the mid-1940s overruling Leeds & Catlin and broadly
undermining

the doctrine of contributory

infringement.

Carbice

involved a patent for a "refrigerating transportation package" in which
dry-ice was strategically placed near the middle of an outer box or carton
in which ice cream or other perishable commodity was shipped.6 ' Both
the ice cream and the gaseous carbon dioxide trapped in the box helped
to protect the dry-ice from exterior heat while the dry-ice prevented the
ice cream from melting. 64 The exclusive licensee under the patent did not
sell the patented transportation package, however. Rather, it sold dry-ice,
exclusive "use" on the patentee while no such right was conferred by the copyright law, the Court
was able to reconcile Bobbs-Merrill with its ruling in A.B. Dick.
55. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
56. See id. at 505-06, 519.
57. 38 Stat. 730, 731, ch. 323, § 3 (1914).
58. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 517.
59. Seeid. at517-18.
60. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
61. See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
62. See Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 668; Minneapolis-HoneywellRegulator Co., 320
U.S. at 684.
63. See Carbice, 283 U.S. at 29.
64. See id.
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licensing its dry-ice purchasers to use the patented transportation
package. In a suit against another supplier of dry-ice, the patentee and its
exclusive licensee alleged that the defendant Carbice Corp. was
contributorily infringing the patent by selling dry-ice, knowing that its
purchasers would use it to construct patented transportation packages. 65
Because the dry-ice was an integral part of the transportation
package, Carbice bore a close resemblance to Leeds & Catlin where the
Court viewed the phonograph disk as "co-act[ing] with the stylus to
produce the result. 66 As in Leeds & Catlin, the defendant supplied a
component of the patented invention employed by its customers to
construct the patented device.67 The issue in Carbice and Leeds & Catlin
thus critically differed from the issue in Motion Picture Patents and A.B.
Dick. In neither Motion Picture Patents nor A.B. Dick were the supplies
deemed by the Court to constitute an integral part of the patent. These
latter cases accordingly involved merely the attempt by the patentee to
control ordinary supplies employed by users with the patented machine,
whereas the former cases involved the unauthorized construction of a
patented device.
Indeed, the striking advance in condemning tying arrangements
made in Carbice was to bar a patentee from establishing infringement in
a case in which the defendant was supplying its customers with a
product (dry-ice) which it knew would be used by them in acts of direct
infringement (constructing the patented transportation package). Under
existing law, the defendant would appear to have been a contributory
infringer, but it was nonetheless barred from relief against the defendant
because such relief would have effectively enforced the tying
arrangements. Even so, contemporary observers might nevertheless have
been surprised and troubled by the inroads which Carbice made upon
the doctrine of contributory infringement. Yet Carbice was not free from
ambiguity. The tied product in Carbice was dry-ice, a standard
commodity with uses outside of the patented transportation package.68
Even though the patented device would not work without it, still Carbice
might be partially reconciled with a narrow view of the old caselaw by
observing that Carbice had barred a patentee from tying a staple to
patented device. That part of Carbice was consistent with Motion
PicturePatents as well as the even older Morgan Envelope. Perhaps the
65.
66.
67.
68.
Jan. 30,

See id. at 30.
Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325, 335 (1909).
See id. at 331-32.
See Dryiceinfo.com, Other Uses, at http://www.dryiceinfo.com/other.htm (last visited
2003).
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new Carbice precedent would not bar relief where the supplies provided
by the defendant were nonstaple articles, as in Leeds & Catlin.
Nonetheless, the fact that Carbice had barred an action for an
acknowledged infringement signaled the broad inroads which the
judicial hostility to tying arrangements was making into patent law.
The ruling in Carbice ultimately gave rise to an articulation of a
formal doctrine of patent misuse in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
69
The latter case, decided in 1942, involved a patent on a salt
Co.
dispensing machine used in the canning industry and a suit by the
patentee against the manufacturer of an infringing machine. The
patentee, which leased its machines under licenses requiring the
licensees to obtain their salt from the patentee, was denied relief for
infringement on the ground that it was misusing its patent in its leases.
The Court ruled that a patentee otherwise entitled to relief for patent
infringement should be denied that relief when it is using its patent to
control the sale of an unpatented product.70 While the Court cited Motion
PicturePatents and Carbice as authority for its holding, the Court added
a further dimension to its evolving set of precedents condemning tying
arrangements under patent law. Carbice had denied a remedy for
infringement when that remedy would reinforce a tie. Now Suppinger
denied a remedy for infringement even when the infringement sued upon
had no relationship to any tie; the remedy would be withheld so long as
the patentee was tying sales to its patent in completely independent
transactions. The parameters of the new doctrine were now emerging
with increasing clarity. Patents could not be employed as devices to
compel the sale of staple products under Motion Picture Patents; nor
could patents be so used even when the staple products were component
parts of the patented invention under Carbice. Now the prohibition on
tying was reinforced by divesting the patentee's power to enforce the
patent during the period in which the tying was employed as a marketing
tool. In the earlier cases, the Court had merely denied the patentee the
power to enforce the tie. In Suppinger, the patentee was being denied the
power to enforce its patent in unrelated ways, as a newly created judicial
tool to fight the practice of tying.
The interrelated threads in the caselaw culminated in the Supreme
Court's 1944 decisions in the Mercoid cases. 7 In the Mercoid cases, the
Honeywell Corporation had manufactured two devices (a combination
69.
70.
71.
Corp. v.

314 U.S. 488 (1942).
See id. at 489-94.
See generally Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944).
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stoker switch and a combination furnace control) which were especially
designed as the respective components of two patented heating
systems. 2 It did not sell licenses to the heating systems separately,
however. Rather, it issued to purchasers of the unpatented devices a
license to incorporate those devices into the construction of one of the
patented heating systems.73 The behavior involved, accordingly,
resembled that in Carbice:the patentee sold an unpatented component of
a patented invention, using a patent license as leverage to make the
sales.74 In the Mercoid cases, however, the unpatented devices were not
staples; they were devices which were uniquely designed as components
of the patented heating systems.75 In this respect, the Mercoid cases were
effectively a replay of Leeds & Catlin.
The Court condemned the ties, taking the opportunity to weave the
earlier strands of its anti-tying caselaw together. First, broadly
characterizing the issue as involving the use of a patent to foster tying,
the Court asserted that patentees had not been allowed to use their
patents as means for selling unpatented products since its 1917 decision
in the Motion Picture Patents case. Second, recognizing that Leeds &
Catlin had allowed a patentee to establish an action for contributory
infringement against a supplier of unique components, the Court
overruled Leeds & Catlin.7 6 It then went to acknowledge that the result77
was "to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement.,
Indeed, practitioners of patent law were not at all reassured by the
Court's further comment that "we need not stop to consider"
what
"residuum [of contributory infringement doctrine] may be left. 7 1
The Mercoid litigation also involved an antitrust claim asserted by
the defendant against Minneapolis-Honeywell, the exclusive licensee
under the patent.79 In sweeping language, the Court appeared to collapse
the patent law issues into an antitrust context. "The legality of any
attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is
measured by the anti-trust laws not by the patent law ....[T]he effort
here made to control competition in this unpatented device plainly
violates the anti-trust laws. 8 °
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 664.
See id. at 663.
See Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 (1931).
See Mid-ContinentInv. Co., 320 U.S. at 663.
See id. at 664-68.
Id.
at 669.
Id.
See Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, 681 (1944).
id. at 684.
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Thus over the thirty years following the enactment of the Clayton
Act, the Supreme Court had first been influenced by the Clayton Act to
introduce competition-policy concerns into its administration of the
patent law. At first, the Court restricted the power of a patentee to
condition a patent license on the sale or lease of an unpatented product.
Later it developed the misuse doctrine as a means of denying a patentee
the aid of the courts in enforcing its patents during the time that it was
attempting to leverage them into other markets. Then, finally, in the
Mercoid cases, the Court narrowed the scope of contributory
infringement in the interest of restricting a patentee's power to leverage
its patent. Concomitantly, it expanded the scope of antitrust law to
expose the patentee to liability when it was misusing its patents. The
Court's aggressive expansion of the misuse doctrine, however, unsettled
the patent bar and provoked the Congress to redefine the law.
B.

The CongressionalResponse to the Mercoid Cases and the
Legislative Definition of Misuse

Although Congress in 1914 was displeased with the Court's early
permissiveness towards patentee tying, 8' at mid-century Congress was
displeased with the Court's later intolerance of patentee tying, as
manifested- in the expansive development of the misuse doctrine in the
Mercoid cases. The expansion of the patent misuse doctrine in those
cases to the point where that doctrine undermined settled understandings
of contributory infringement gave rise to a legislative redefinition of
misuse in the 1952 revision of the Patent Act.82 In that redefinition,
Congress overruled the Mercoid cases.
In the Mercoid cases, the Court-following its own prior decisions
such as Carbice and Suppinger-had ruled that the ties of unpatented
devices (the combination stoker switch and the combination furnace
control) to patent licenses (licenses for the heating system) constituted
misuse. Although the facts of the Mercoid cases differed from these
earlier decisions in that the unpatented components in Mercoid were
specially made for the patented heating system whereas the unpatented
materials in the earlier cases were staples, the Court did not see this
difference as relevant. Indeed, in overruling Leeds & Catlin, the Court
recognized that under its Mercoid decision, a patentee would no longer

81. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
82. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
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possess the exclusive right to market uniquely designed components of a
patented combination.83
This was precisely the point at which the new definitions of misuse
and contributory infringement were directed. Section 271 of the Patent
Act makes the sale of a product which is especially made for, or adapted
for use in, a patented product (and not a staple article or commodity)
contributory infringement.14 It then explicitly authorizes the patentee to
engage in acts which, if performed by another without the patentee's
consent, would constitute contributory infringement. "5 Thus, by
authorizing the patentee to derive revenue or to license another to
perform acts which otherwise would constitute contributory
infringement, section 271 overrules the Mercoid cases. It also overrules
the Mercoid cases when it authorizes the patentee to enforce its rights
against contributory infringement by a third party who provides parts
specially designed for the patented product.
Section 271 was further elaborated in 1988.86 For now, it is
important to see the state of the law in 1952. The Court's expansion of
the patent misuse doctrine to prohibit the tie of unique components of a
patented combination was rejected by the Congress at that time.
Congress, in the 1952 patent law revision, explicitly gave patentees the
right to exploit their patents through the marketing of specially made
components of patented inventions.
C. Per Se Illegality and Intellectual PropertyRights
Just at the time when the Congress was rolling back the Court's
expansive development of the misuse doctrine, the Court was attacking
tying arrangements on another front. In the 1950s, the Court treated
virtually all tying arrangements as effectively illegal. In Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States,87 the Court set forth the standards to be
employed in evaluating the lawfulness of tying arrangements under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. Under the Clayton Act, tying arrangements
were unlawful if either the defendant possessed a monopolistic position
in the market for the tying product or if a substantial amount of
commerce in the tied product was restrained. Under the Sherman Act,
tying arrangements were unlawful if both of those conditions were

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. at 668.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
See id. § 271(d).
See id.; see also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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fulfilled." The courts ultimately ruled that a "substantial" amount of
commerce meant merely that more than a de minimis amount of dollars
was involved." Thus almost any arrangement which tied two
commodities together would apparently violate the Clayton Act.
Because the Clayton Act applied only to "commodities," the
Sherman Act governed tying arrangements involving services.9"
Accordingly, in these cases it was important to determine whether the
defendant possessed the market power required for a per se tying
violation. In a series of opinions, the Court progressively reduced the
amount of market power needed to establish a violation. In 1953, TimesPicayune Publishing Co. v. United States required a "monopolistic
position" in the market for the tying product." By 1958, Northern
Pacific92 had reduced that requirement to "sufficient economic power" to
"appreciably restrain" competition in the tied product market.9 3 If
competition in the tied product was appreciably restrained when a
substantial amount of the tied product was subjected to the tying
arrangement, then this formulation effectively eliminated a separate
market power requirement and collapsed the Sherman Act standard to
the standard of the Clayton Act. In Loew's, 94 decided in 1962, the market
power requirement was further reduced to "the tying product's
desirability to consumers or ...uniqueness in its attributes." 95 At the end
of the 1960s, the first Fortner96 case had announced that "the presence of
any appreciable restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for
invalidating the tie," thus confirming that the Sherman Act test had
indeed been collapsed into the Clayton Act test.9 7 When the Court
adverted to the market power element in Fortner, it described it as
satisfied whenever buyer preferences enable the seller to charge a higher
price to some buyers ("buyers-whether few or many, whether scattered
throughout the market or part of some group within the market"98), thus

88. See id. at 608-09.
89. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969) ($190,000
sufficient); Detroit City Dairy, Inc. v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 472 (E.D. Mich.
1975) ($86,376.72 not insubstantial).
90. See Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 609-10 n.27.
91. See id. at 608-09.
92. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
93. Id. at 6.
94. United States v. Loew's Inc. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
95. Id.
at 45.
96. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States, 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
97. Id.
at 503.
98. Id.
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apparently reducing the market power element to the premium
commanded by a well-known brand.
At the same time as it was reducing the market power threshold
requisite for a tying violation of the Sherman Act, the Court was also
raising a presumption that the presence of a patent or copyright would
satisfy any such market power requirement. The raising of this
presumption may have been obscured for a while because the Court's
various statements were not always consistent or straightforward. In the
end, however, it equated a patent or copyright with the market power
requisite for a Sherman Act violation, thus making tying arrangements
by the holder of a patent or copyright effectively per se illegal.
Times-Picayune-decided just one year after the Congressional
repudiation of the Court's Mercoid decisions-is a convenient place to
pick up the evolution of the Court's treatment of intellectual property
rights in Sherman Act tying analysis. In Times-Picayune, the Court
described a prior case, International Salt Co. v. United States,99 as
having inferred the requisite market power for a tying violation from
patents: "The patents on their face conferred monopolistic, albeit lawful,
market control, and the volume of salt affected by the tying practice was
not 'insignificant or insubstantial.""0' The patentee in the International
Salt case had leased patented salt dispensing machines to food
processors, conditioned on the lessees purchasing their supplies of salt
from the patentee.'' In the InternationalSalt case itself, the Court had
condemned the tie, but referred ambiguously to the significance of the
patented nature of the salt dispensing machines.' 2 Observing that the
defendant's "patents confer a limited monopoly of the invention they
reward," the Court went on to assert that "Intemational['s] ... patents
afford [it] no immunity from the antitrust laws."'' 3 Thus, in International
Salt, the Court held--consistent with the language of the Clayton Actthat the patents did not protect it against an antitrust charge, but its
reference to the limited monopoly conferred by the patent is ambiguous.
Did the Court mean by this reference that the existence of the patents in
some way supported the imposition of liability? Although (as we saw
above) that was the view expressed in Times-Picayune, a mere two years
after its decision in Times-Picayune, the Court, in Standard Oil Co. of
99.
100.
Co., 332
101.
102.
103.

332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) (quoting Int'l Salt
U.S. at 396).
See Int'l Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 394.
See id. at 395.
Id. at 395-96.
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Californiav. United States,""' said of InternationalSalt that "[i]t was not
established that equivalent machines were unobtainable.' '05 In
combination, these several judicial statements could be read as saying
that a patent will give rise to a presumption of market power, even
though the patent in reality does not confer an economic monopoly.
Although the Court muddied the waters somewhat in its 1958 decision in
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States where it asserted that the
InternationalSalt decision "placed no reliance on the fact that a patent
was involved," it subsequently appeared to reconfirm the market power
presumption.'O In its 1962 decision in United States v. Loew's, the Court
explicitly ruled that the power requirement for a Sherman Act tying
violation is presumed when the tying product is patented or
copyrighted.'07
Thus during the three decades following World War II, the Court
was strengthening the prohibitions against tying in several ways. Even as
Congress repudiated the Court's effort to expand the patent misuse
doctrine in the Mercoid cases, the Court was expanding the antitrust
prohibitions against tying. This expansion was taking place on several
levels. First, the Clayton Act was construed so broadly that the tie of one
commodity to another was effectively made per se illegal. Second, the
standards for violating the Sherman Act-which applied to serviceswere progressively lowered. What was first a requirement of monopoly
power in the market for the tying product became some indefinite degree
of market power; and the amount of power that would satisfy the courts
became less and less each time the standard was articulated. Finally, the
Court raised a presumption that the market power requirement was
satisfied whenever the tying product was patented or copyrighted.
The extension of the presumption of market power to copyright
revealed this presumption was not about real market power. Indeed, the
parallel caselaw development, which had reduced the market power
element generally to that commanded by a branded product, showed that
this element of the offense had been eviscerated. It was not surprising
then that some lower courts raised a presumption of market power from
the existence of a trademark.' °8

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

337 U.S. 293 (1949).
Id.at 305.
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 9 (1958).
See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50 (9th Cir. 1971).
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THE REVISION

The Scholarly Rebellion on the Antitrust Treatment of
Tying Arrangements

The hostility that the Supreme Court had evidenced towards tying
arrangements was premised on the view that "[t]ying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition."' 9 Yet
beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s scholars were beginning to
examine the economic effects of tying arrangements and coming to the
conclusion that tying arrangements were mostly employed for purposes
of price discrimination. Aaron Director and Edward Levi began the
challenge to the Court's negative view of tying arrangements," 0 and they
were shortly followed by the critiques of Ward Bowman and M.L.
Burstein.' In the late 1970s, Richard Posner and Robert Bork
incorporated the substance of these academic critiques into influential
books,"' whose publication largely coincided with the rise of the socalled Chicago School of antitrust analysis.
The argument put forth by these critics of the Court's tying
jurisprudence was that tying could not enlarge market power. A
monopolist might choose to exploit its power entirely in the
monopolized market, or instead it might choose to impose a tie, by
requiring buyers of the monopolized product to purchase a second "tied"
product. If it took the latter course, however, it would incur a cost.
Purchasers who paid a premium price for the tied product would subtract
that premium from their reservation prices for the monopolized product.
The monopolist could earn supra normal profits on the tied product only
if it accepted a lesser return on its monopolized product. The theoretical
maximum return possible is that of a perfectly discriminating
monopolist. Such a monopolist captures all of the consumer surplus,
turning it into profit (albeit also eliminating the resource misallocation
generally associated with monopoly pricing). A monopolist thus could
allocate profits among different products, but it could not enlarge its
109. Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 305-06; Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 498 (1969); Loew's, 371 U.S. at 44; N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6; Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
110. See generally Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation,
51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1956).
111.See generally Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957); M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 62 (1960).
112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 172-74 (1976); ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 375-81 (1978).
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aggregate monopoly power. Under this analysis, tying is useful primarily
for price discrimination. It can assist in separating different demands and
in adjusting pricing strategies to each such demand.
Recent critics of this "Chicago" type analysis have suggested new
ways to look at tying arrangements. These critics have tended to direct
their attention to strategic uses of tying as means for impeding entry.
Michael Whinston and Barry Nalebuff, for example, have developed
analytical models in which an incumbent seller, tying two products
together, substantially reduces the incentives for an entrant to challenge
that incumbent in one or both markets. In both models, entry is deterred
because tying changes the incumbent's pricing incentives, generating
lower prices than would otherwise be the case. These lower prices
reduce the entrant's profit expectations and thus discourage it from
entering. In Whinston's model, an incumbent monopolist that is able to
make a credible commitment to maintain a tie between two products (at
least one of which commands supracompetitive prices) discourages entry
because its ability to capture monopoly profits is tied to its ability to sell
the bundle."3 In Barry Nalebuff's model, a monopolist of two products
bundles them together, thus enabling the monopolist effectively to
engage in price discrimination (since purchasers place different values
on each of the two products) and thus to extract more consumer surplus
from both markets." 4 Nalebuff shows how this behavior reduces the
expected profits of a potential entrant at little or no cost to the
incumbent. Indeed, in Nalebuff's model, the incumbent is able to reduce
the potential profits available to an entrant's bundling at the same time
that it is increasing its own profits. This is possible because bundling
enables it to exploit the differing appeals of each of the two products to
overlapping market segments. If further deterrence is needed, the
incumbent is able (through bundling) to drastically reduce the potential
profits of an entrant while incurring only very modest reductions in its
own profits.
Although Whinston and Nalebuff show us circumstances in which
an incumbent seller's tying (or bundling) can be employed to deter entry,
their models make clear that the entry-deterrence effect results from
reduced prices and a concomitant increase in output over what would be
the case without bundling. With reduced prices and increased output,
overall welfare would appear to be enhanced.
113. See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837,
839 (1990).
114. See Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling, YALE ICF WORKING PAPER NO. 99-14, 1 (Nov. 22,
1999), available at http://www.uchicago.edu/fac/finance/papers/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2002).
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It is not clear, therefore, that the insights provided by Whinston and
Nalebuff would be likely to undermine the broad skepticism towards the
per se rule against tying generated by Director, Levi, Bowman, Burstein,
Posner, Bork and others identified with the Chicago School. Indeed,
Whinston and Nalebuff have shown us the output-enhancing effects
generated by tying practices. In their models the output-enhancing
effects are associated with the ability of bundling to effect pricediscrimination. And it is precisely that ability, of tying to facilitate pricediscrimination, that has been at the core of the division between those
who would retain the per se rule and those who would abolish it. Indeed,
critics of the per se rule against tying frequently point to the old IBM
computer-card case,' as an illustration of how tying-induced price
discrimination can be innocuous or even beneficial. In that case the IBM
Corporation required those who wanted its computers to buy their
computer cards from it (thus tying the cards to its computers). By
allocating a high portion of profits to the cards, IBM was able to charge
intensive users a higher price for the computer-card package than less
intensive users; this practice of keying the charge to the use of the
equipment is commonly employed by equipment lessors and is a form of
value-of-service pricing." 6 Thus IBM both discriminated in price and
replicated a common pricing technique. If IBM could have charged each
customer its reservation price, it would have increased output to a point
approaching the competitive output, and would have eliminated the
resource misallocation usually associated with monopoly. Indeed,
Justice O'Connor who was familiar with the literature on price
discrimination, acknowledged (in her Jefferson Parishconcurrence) that
such discrimination could "decrease rather than increase the economic
costs of a seller's market power."' Because the restraints shown by
Whinston and Nalebuff are generated by an output-enhancing effect of
price discrimination, their models do not appear to weaken the critics
who argue that price discrimination does not always reduce output.
Finally, the entry deterrence effects identified by Whinston and Nalebuff
resemble those produced by limit pricing, a practice that appears to be
lawful so long as the monopolist does not price below its marginal or
average-variable costs.18
115. See Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
116. See POSNER, supra note 112, at 174; BORK, supra note 112, at 377.
117. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 n.4 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
118. The courts have struggled with the issue of whether limit pricing should be declared
unlawful. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 1988);
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B.

The JudicialRevision

These academic critiques ultimately had an impact on the caselaw.
The second Fortner case, decided in 1977, began to move towards

making tying violations harder (rather than easier) to establish." 9 In that
case the Court began to rehabilitate the market power requirement. The
market power requirement appeared largely restored by 1984. In that
year the Court ruled in Jefferson Parish21 that a market share of thirty
percent was insufficient to infer the power necessary to establish a tying
violation. Jefferson Parish was a milestone in another way as well. In

that case four Justices joined in a concurring opinion urging that the per
se rule applicable to tying arrangements be abandoned.
C. CongressionalAction on Tying Arrangements in the Late 1980s
In 1988, Congress strengthened section 271 of the Patent Act,

providing a wider safe haven for patentees to engage in tying.
Amendments to section 271 in 1988 added clauses (4) and (5) to
paragraph (d).' 2' Clause (4) explicitly authorizes patentees to refuse to
license or to use their patents. Clause (5), with one important exception,
authorizes patentees to condition patent licenses or sales of patented
products on the acquisition of licenses to rights in other patents or

Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 1984); MCI
Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1114 (7th Cir.1983); Transamerica Computer
Co. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1983). The lower courts, however,
seem ultimately to have concluded that the administrative difficulties involved in identifying limit
pricing would preclude a policy of outlawing that practice. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell
Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234-35 (lst Cir. 1983); see also United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2001). Beyond those administrative difficulties, the lower courts have been building
a consensus around the Areeda-Tumer standard for evaluating predatory pricing. Under that
standard, any price that is equal to, or above, marginal cost (or its surrogate, average variable cost)
is presumed lawful. See generally Rebel Oil Co. v. At. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 987 (1995). Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted the
Areeda-Tumer standard, it has repeatedly stated that a price cannot be treated as predatory unless it
falls beneath an appropriate measure of cost, thus adopting a broad cost-based approach to predatory
pricing consistent with that of the Areeda-Tumer standard. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328, 341 n.10, 354 n.12 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117,
n.12 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 n.8 (1986).
Because limit pricing involves setting prices at below profit-maximizing levels in order to exclude
rivals from the market, it appears to be a form of predatory pricing. Its lawfulness, therefore, even in
a Whinston or Nalebuff context may well be subject to the rules governing predatory pricing.
119. See generally U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
120. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 2.
121. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-703, Title II, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674, 4676
(1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000)).
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purchases of separate products. But clause (5) excepts from that
authorization cases in which a patentee possesses market power in the
relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license
or sale is conditioned.
In section 271, the law now recognizes that a narrow construction
of patent rights is sometimes inconsistent with the patent law's objective
of allowing the patentee to fully exploit its invention. Thus, as in
Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 22 when Rohm & Haas
discovered that the known chemical propanil was an effective herbicide,
it was able to effectively exploit its patent on that use by marketing the
unpatented chemical to farmers tied to a license to use it as a herbicide.
Although section 271 then permitted Rohm & Haas to derive revenue
from the sale of a unpatented component of a patented process, Dawson,
the defendant, unsuccessfully contended that Rohm & Haas had a duty
to license the patent to rival marketers of propanil. By refusing thus to
license, Rohm & Haas-according to Dawson-had misused their
patent. ' The amendments to the statute (in clause (4)) ratify the Court's
decision that the patentee was not obliged to offer such a license. The
new clause (5) is directed precisely at the license or sale of a patent or
patented product which is conditioned upon the license of another patent
or the sale of another product. Only in that case is the lawfulness of the
patentee's behavior limited to the context in which the patentee lacks
market power.
It is interesting that section 271 treats ties involving unrelated
products differently from the way that it treats "ties" that involve
combining a patent license with specially made components. Any
patentee may tie a patent license with a specially made component. But
only a patentee without market power is permitted to tie unrelated
products together. This may reflect the view of the Congress that ties of
specially made products are more obvious ways of marketing the
patented invention and do not appear to be extending the patent beyond
the scope intended by the patent law. Conversely, the tie of two,
unrelated products appears more like a traditional tie. And traditional
ties do not fall under the ban of an antitrust per se rule unless the
patentee possesses market power.' 24 Perhaps Congress sought to reflect
that antitrust rule in the patent law as a measure of misuse. Indeed, the
approach of section 271 to misuse is largely consistent with section
three's approach to antitrust evaluation. In affirming the right of the
122. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
123. See id. at 183.
124. See generally Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 2.
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patentee to control the market for specially made components, section
271 can be understood as redefining the exclusive rights conferred by
patents but doing so in accordance with much traditional understanding,
and thus with an understanding which25 must have been widely shared at
the time of section three's enactment.'
V.

ACADEMIC ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILING THE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAWS

Legal scholars have examined the intellectual property/antitrust
interface for many years. Originally these academic inquiries focused
upon conflicts between patent and antitrust policies, but with the
extension of copyright protection to software in 1980, legal
commentators have begun to examine the interaction between copyright
and antitrust policies as well. In this Article I will discuss only four of
these commentators: Louis Kaplow, because his analysis has dominated
legal scholarship for two decades; and three very recent commentators:
Mark Patterson, Michael Carrier, and David McGowan.
A.

The Approach of Louis Kaplow

In 1984, Louis Kaplow developed a cost/benefit approach to the
patent/antitrust interface, 26 arguing that restrictive agreements or other
behavior should be subject (or not subject) to antitrust condemnation
depending upon the ratio of patentee reward to the social cost of the
restriction. If the ratio is sufficiently high, the practice should be upheld
on the rationale that the patent law goals predominate. Conversely, if the
ratio is very low, then the practice should be condemned 2because
in
7
those situations antitrust goals predominate over patent goals.'
Kaplow keyed his analysis to an examination of the costs and
benefits of the patent system as a whole. From that examination, he
developed a marginal analysis of that system that he illustrated with
hypothetical extensions (or reductions) in the patent term. A one-year
extension of the patent term would provide an additional incentive to
inventors. The marginal social benefit of that additional incentive would
be the additional inventions that it brought forth. The social cost of that
extension, however, would be the monopoly restriction for that extra

125.
126.
L. REV.
127.

See generally Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909).
See generally Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection: A Reappraisal,97 HARV.
1813 (1984).
See id. at 1829, 1831-32.
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year on all the inventions that would have been produced without it. 2
Kaplow's marginal analysis was a major step in the evaluation of the
patent system. Kaplow then used his marginal analysis of the patent
system to evaluate practices that were or might be subjected to antitrust
analysis. Broadly speaking, Kaplow argued that practices that produced
a better ratio between patentee reward and social loss than a marginal
extension of the patent term should be upheld.
Kaplow repeatedly acknowledged the serious informational
problems that would affect an attempt to apply his analysis to actual
behavior. He suggested that a form of his analysis, however, could be
employed to improve our approach to the patent/antitrust interface. His
ratio test would not produce finely tuned results, but it would
nonetheless enable us to distinguish between restraints that produced
substantial rewards to the patentee with only minimal social harm and
restraints that produced only modest returns to the patentee while
imposing substantial harm on society. We will see below that Kaplow's
approach continues to be on the cutting edge of legal developments in
the new century.
B.

The Approach of ProfessorMark Patterson

Mark Patterson has developed a different approach to the
relationship between the intellectual property laws and the antitrust
laws, 29 and has illustrated his approach by explaining how it would
apply to the Xerox and Kodak cases, among others. Patterson
distinguishes between the "invention" protected by patent law and the
product in which the invention is embodied. Patterson respects the
patentee's exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented invention,
but not necessarily its exclusive rights over the product in which the
invention is embodied. Thus, Patterson argues, the independent servicing
organizations ("ISOs") did not want to "use" the patentee's invention. It
was the equipment owners who would "use" the invention embodied in
the parts. The ISOs merely wanted to provide repair and maintenance
services. They needed access to the parts in which the invention was
embodied in order to perform these services, but the ISOs themselves
would not be "using" the parts.130
On this analysis, Patterson argues that the Xerox's refusal to sell
parts to the ISOs was not protected by federal patent law. The district

128. See id.
at 1816,1831-32,1821-45.
129. See generally Patterson, supra note I.
130. See i. at 1133-35,1142-48.
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court had ruled that because Xerox held the exclusive right to make, use
and sell its invention, it was not required to sell parts to the IS0s." On
the contrary, the district court asserted, a patentee has the right to retain
all of those rights itself. It is obliged to sell to no one. The flaw in the
court's analysis, Patterson responds, is its neglect of the distinction
between the invention and the product in which the invention is
embodied. The patentee was not obligated to make the invention
available to the ISOs, but the ISOs did not want the invention. They
merely wanted the part, i.e., the physical product in which the invention
was embodied. It was the equipment owners that wanted to use the
invention, and the patentee was perfectly willing to allow the equipment
owners to use the invention, as evidenced by the fact that the patentee
sold directly to users who performed their own maintenance and repair.
In a sense, the ISOs were mere conduits in the transmission of the
invention from the patentee to the equipment owners. Since they would
not be "using" the invention, Xerox's refusal to sell the parts to them
was not an exercise of its exclusive "use" rights under the patent law.
That refusal, accordingly, was not protected under patent law. Indeed,
according to Patterson, that refusal to sell could be a "misuse" of the
patent.32
Patterson's critique of the district court's decision applies to the
subsequent decision on appeal by the Federal Circuit, since that court
affirmed the district court's earlier ruling on essentially the same
rationale.' He also believes that his approach would have produced a
sounder basis for the Kodak decision. In Kodak, it will be recalled, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that Kodak's refusal to supply patented parts to ISOs
was not protected by the patent law because Kodak's reliance upon its
intellectual property rights was "pretextual.' 34 Patterson agrees with the
Federal Circuit's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon the
defendant's subjective intent. Intellectual property issues are best served
by eliminating, so far as practicable, issues involving subjective intent.
He believes that the Ninth Circuit could have reached the same result
that it did, if it had distinguished between the invention and the product
in which the invention is embodied.'35 Employing that distinction, the

131. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1139 (D. Kan. 1997).
132. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 1142-44.
133. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
134. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1219-20
(9th Cir. 1997).
135. See Patterson, supra note 1, at 1139, 1142.
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court could have ruled that because the ISOs did not want to "use" the
invention but only wanted access to the parts (in which the invention
was embodied), the patent law did not protect Kodak's refusal to supply
those parts to the ISOs.
C. The Approach of ProfessorMichael A. Carrier
A quite different approach to reconciling the patent and antitrust
laws was recently presented by Professor Michael A. Carrier. 3 6 Carrier's
approach is to deal with the relationships between the two sets of laws
procedurally: An antitrust defendant seeking to justify its behavior under
the patent law would have the benefit of a presumption of lawfulness "as
long as there is a plausible justification for the [challenged] action other
than injuring competitors."'37 Once the presumption is raised, the burden
of production shifts back to the plaintiff (who continues to bear the
overall burden of proof). The plaintiff now has the opportunity to rebut
the presumption by proving that competition, rather than patents, is
responsible for innovation in the defendant's industry. This rebuttal is
established when the plaintiff proves the importance of competition over
patents from both an ex ante and an ex post perspective. The plaintiff
proves the ex ante case by proving (1) that the market itself provides the
incentives to innovate separate from patent law; and either (2) that the
product was not costly to invent and commercialize; or (3) that the
product is not easily and cheaply imitated. The plaintiff proves the ex
post case by proving that innovation in the defendant's industry is
cumulative rather than discrete.'38
To prove the initial ex ante issue, the plaintiff must prove that
competition provides the incentives to innovate. It does this when it
establishes that in the particular industry involved, the first to enter with
a new product is able to maintain a leadership role as a result of lead
time, learning curve, or network advantages or through the effects of
customer familiarity and/or brand loyalty. The second ex ante issue is
designed to show that patent protection is not necessary to recoup
research and development costs. The third ex ante issue is designed to
show that the costs and other difficulties of copying themselves furnish
the needed protection for recoupment of development costs. "9

136.
137.
138.
139.

See generally Carrier, supra note 1.
Id. at 817.
Seeid.at818-31.
See id.
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The ex post case seeks to build upon the insight that in some
industries innovation proceeds, to a large extent, by drawing upon earlier
innovations. In such contexts, it is at least theoretically possible that
intellectual property rights might impede invention by erecting barriers
to the use of essential elements in the inventive process. Carrier thus
implicitly suggests that patents are less important in industries where
they may sometimes impede invention than in industries characterized
by discrete non-cumulative inventions. So this is part of the plaintiff's
rebuttal case: the plaintiff must prove that invention in the defendant's
industry is cumulative rather than discrete.
If the plaintiff rebuts the presumption of lawfulness, the defendant
is then permitted a surrebuttal. In its surrebuttal, the defendant is given
the opportunity to establish "with actual evidence that the relevant
market in the industry is in fact marked by innovation."' ° Thus even if
the plaintiff, in its rebuttal, shows that competition, rather than patents,
is responsible for innovation in the industry, the defendant can still come
back to establish that the market is in fact generating sufficient
innovation incentives. Accordingly, this market does not need the help
of the antitrust laws to foster innovation.
D. The Approach of David McGowan
In contrast to the other commentators who have focused their
attention on patent law, David McGowan has directed his attention to
the copyright/antitrust interface, especially in the context of a market
exhibiting network effects.141 McGowan divides cases into those
involving pure exclusion by an intellectual property rights holder and
those involving conditional exclusion. Observing that intellectual
property rights are rights to exclude, McGowan believes that no antitrust
issues are triggered by unconditional exclusion. When an intellectual
property rights holder excludes conditionally, however, then it is
possible that some competitive harm may occur as a result. This is the
area where antitrust policy enters. McGowan uses the Kodak case as an
example. On initial examination, the Kodak case appears as a case of
pure exclusion. Kodak refused to make its patented parts available to the
ISOs. The resulting Kodak monopoly in service would appear to be a
lawful consequence of its exercise of its core right to exclude. Yet
McGowan asserts, this is too simple. If Kodak charged supracompetitive
prices in the service market, then anticompetitive effects could result,
140. Id. at 833.
141. See generally McGowan, supra note 1.
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when and if users inefficiently substituted repair for the replacement of
parts. 4 2 Even if this effect could be shown, however, the issue would
still be in doubt because Kodak, as a patentee, was entitled to charge
monopoly prices for its parts. If Kodak charged monopoly prices for
parts, then perhaps the restraint in the service market would be no worse
than the restraint caused by Kodak's monopoly service-market prices. I
might add that if Kodak discriminated in the prices of its parts, selling to
each customer at its reservation price, then there would be no
misallocation of resources at all.
In addressing the problem of a networks-effects monopoly (like
Microsoft's operating-systems), McGowan recognizes that the
monopoly results from the monopolist's intellectual property rights. One
reason that he is willing to accept that monopoly is that he believes that
it is vulnerable to displacement when a sufficiently superior technology
arises to challenge it. Microsoft Windows is now the de facto industry
standard: it is the platform to which most software is written. But a
sufficiently superior technology could displace Windows. The challenge
is that the newer technology would have to be enough of an
improvement over Windows to overcome the switching costs that users
would incur in adopting it. Despite this potential inter-standard
competition, McGowan sees a place for antitrust intervention in network
markets. He would be willing to tolerate antitrust intervention to foster
intra-standard competition when that intervention does not pose a
serious threat to incentives for leapfrogging technology and thus to interstandard competition. Here McGowan shows his concern with the longterm. He accepts the lawfulness of a monopoly conferred by copyright,
relying upon long-term competition among copyright holders to produce
superior technology. And, second, he limits antitrust intervention in the
short-term in order to preserve the long-term competition that copyright,
in the network setting, makes possible.'43
E. Assessments of the Academic Contributions
1. The Patterson Approach
There is much to recommend Patterson's creative approach to
intellectual property analysis. Indeed, a distinction analogous to
Patterson's distinction between the invention and the product in which
the invention is embodied is made in copyright law. Copyright law
142. See id. at 491,509, 517-18.
143. See id. at519-23.
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explicitly distinguishes between the copyrighted expression and the
physical product in which the expression is embodied.' 44 Patent law itself
implicitly recognizes that distinction in its first-sale doctrine.' 45 Yet that
distinction, even in copyright law, raises its own set of problems.
Copyright law, for example, protects designs of useful articles only to
the extent that the design incorporates pictorial, graphic or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of
the article. 46 Sometimes this separate identification is impossible, thus
negating a distinction between the artistic content of an article and the
utilitarian aspects of that article. By analogy, the patented "invention"
also may often be impossible to identify separately from the physical
product in which it is embodied. Patterson would probably respond that
his distinction does not require the identification of separate constituent
elements in a physical article but rather helps to distinguish the
exploitation of the creative element from the exploitation of the
uncreative elements.
Yet Patterson's distinction is ultimately problematic. Would it
require a patentee to sell to any wholesaler on the theory that the
wholesaler was not "using" the patented invention, but merely
transmitting it to ultimate users? Under Patterson's theory, how should
we understand the exclusive right to sell? Patterson would have Xerox
sell the "physical product" to the ISOs without impairing the patentee's
exclusive rights over "use." Would the sale of the physical product also
be consistent with the patentee's exclusive sale rights? How would such
a sale affect the application of the first-sale doctrine? Could the patentee
assert that although it sold the product, it did not sell the invention, thus
controlling the invention embodied in the product even after that sale?
A final objection to Patterson's recommendations takes us back to
Louis Kaplow. Kaplow argued in favor of upholding restrictions in4
which the return to the patentee is high and the social cost is low. 4
Patterson appears to be focusing upon the kind of cases illustrated by the
refusal of Xerox and Kodak to sell replacement parts to ISOs. The
Supreme Court's Kodak decision 41 surprised many observers by holding
that a manufacturer's physically unique parts constituted an antitrust
market. Justice Scalia dissented in that case, partially on the ground that

144.
145.

See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000).
See Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech., Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993); DONALD

S. CHIsUM, 5 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[21[a] (Rev. 1997 and Supp. 2001).

146. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works");
147. See Kaplow, supra note 126, at 1827.
148. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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the harm caused by a manufacturer's exploitation of the aftermarket for
its parts did not rise to the level of antitrust concern. 49 At the same time,
the sole beneficiary of the sale of patented parts in the replacement
aftermarket is the patentee. The practice thus appears to meet the
requirements of Kaplow's ratio test. It provides substantial benefits to
the patentee and minimal harm to society.
2. The Carrier Approach
Carrier's approach is both thoughtful and imaginative. Yet there
would be immense difficulties in carrying it out. The very first issue is
the condition for the application of the presumption. The presumption
applies "as long as there is a plausible justification for the [challenged]
action other than injuring competitors."'50 The very fact of competing in
a market means that each firm is seeking to injure its competitors by
taking sales away from them." Probably Carrier means that the
presumption applies so long as there is an efficiency-based justification
for the firm's behavior. The next troublesome issues lie in the rebuttal.
The plaintiff carries the burden of proving that competition, rather than
patents, is responsible for innovation in the defendant's industry.'52 This
form of statement is awkward because both competition and patents are
often important to innovation and Carrier himself recognizes this.'
What Carrier is after is proof that the factual predicates underlying
intellectual property protection are absent in the defendant's market and
that invention, when it does take place in that market, tends to be
cumulative, i.e., built upon prior inventions. Carrier fails to
acknowledge, however, that patents are often necessary for innovation
precisely because of competition. Patents protect the innovator from the
appropriation of its invention by rivals and customers. In many
situations, it is only the rivals who constitute the potential appropriators.
In the absence of potential appropriation by rivals, patents often would
not be needed.
Issues (1), (2) and (3) in the ex ante part of the rebuttal case are
designed to describe the kind of market failure for which intellectual
property is a remedy. Thus (subject to the qualifications set forth in the

149. See id. at 493-95.
150. Carrier, supra note 1,at 817.
151. See, e.g., Austin v. Am. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons, 253 F.3d 967, 974 (7th Cir.
2001) (Posner, J.) (referring to "lawful competition [as] an 'injury' (to competitors hurt by
competition)").
152. See Carrier, supra note 1,at 819.
153. See id. at 852.
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following paragraph) the plaintiff seems to be required to prove that the
preconditions for intellectual property protection do not exist in the
defendant's industry. The design of the rebuttal case thus follows
Carrier's apparent belief that patents are important in some industries
and unimportant in other industries. This proposition, however, appears
to conflict with the presuppositions of the patent law. If we knew that
patents were in fact unimportant to innovation in particular industries,
then we would redesign the patent law so that it applied only where it in
fact encouraged invention. Indeed, the patent law is intended to foster
invention everywhere. And inventions are often both unexpected and
unanticipated.
We should also observe that the test is multi-focused: It focuses on
the "industry" and the "market" when it examines economic incentives
broadly but then it also examines how those incentives have affected the
creation of the defendant's product. Thus, although ex ante rebuttal issue
(1) asks whether the "market" provides incentives to innovate, issues
(2) and (3) focus, respectively, upon whether the "product" was easily
and cheaply created and whether it can be easily and cheaply copied.
Thus there appears to be a shift in perspective from general market
conditions in the first issue to an examination of the particular product
involved in the litigation involving issues (2) and (3). There is nothing
wrong in such a shift. But there are traps for the unwary here. In
Carrier's test the connection between the broad "market" perspective
and the narrower "product" characteristics may be less than it seems.
The market may well provide incentives to innovate as reflected in
small product improvements that would be treated as "obvious" under
the patent law.154 Yet the same market may not provide incentives to
innovate in more costly, nonobvious ways without intellectual property
protection. Thus it appears that a plaintiff might well be able to satisfy
issue (1) by proving that there has been substantial innovation in the
market (and that the innovators have maintained their leadership), even
if much of that innovation does not measure up to the patent law
threshold of nonobviousness. Then a plaintiff can prevail on the rebuttal
by proving either issue (2) or (3). Suppose that the invention in question
was both nonobvious and the result of a "flash of creative genius."' 55
That is, the invention was beyond the abilities of an ordinary
professional in the field, but had not been costly to invent. Under the
Carrier proposal, the plaintiff would have rebutted the presumption of

154. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
155. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
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lawfulness. Or the plaintiff could rebut the presumption by proving that
the product could not be easily and cheaply copied. The proposal thus
substitutes the difficulty of copying for patent protection.
On the ex-post issue, Carrier distinguishes between industries
characterized by discrete inventions and those characterized by
cumulative inventions. "6 Here the test shifts the general perspective
subtly from a "market" to an "industry."' 57 This may not be particularly
problematic in many cases, but it does raise the question of whether we
look to an industry or to the particular relevant market in which the
defendant operates. The distinction between cumulative and discrete
patterns of invention, however, is related to the distinction between socalled pioneer inventions and follow-on inventions. The invention of the
radio, for example, was a pioneer invention and it produced in its wake a
host of follow-on inventions, many of which drew from earlier followon inventions. What is missing here is the recognition that pioneer
inventions are always possible, even in industries otherwise
characterized by cumulative innovation.
Of course, Carrier is not denying patent protection in situations in
which the plaintiff proves the rebuttal issues. Patent protection continues
to exist; it is just subordinated to antitrust law in those situations. But
that means that behavior that would ordinarily be protected by patent
law becomes unprotected. The issue comes down to whether the public
good is better furthered by the application of antitrust or patent law in
the situations identified by the rebuttal. This is the stumbling block.
Antitrust law has primarily a short-term focus; patent and other
intellectual property laws focus upon the longer term. We do not know,
as Carrier reminds us, the ideal patent term or scope of protection.' 8
Because we are unable to quantify the benefits that patent law bestows
upon society, we are unable to determine when, if at all, it is socially
beneficial to subordinate patent law to antitrust law. We do know,
however, that the benefits to society from technological innovation
dwarf the harms caused by monopolistic restraints.15 9 That knowledge
should give us pause, when we are asked to subordinate antitrust law to
patent law.
Doubts about the workability of Carrier's scheme are also
generated by one of his own examples. He suggests that competition
156. See Carrier, supra note 1, at 829-31.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 850.
159. See generally Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and TechnologicalProgress,62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987).
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itself generates adequate incentives for innovation in the semiconductor
industry and by implication that patent protection is unnecessary.160
Indeed, twice he explicitly states that the plaintiff would satisfy the
rebuttal requirements in the semiconductor industry. 6' Whether or not
patent protection is critical in the semiconductor industry, 62 that industry
apparently did need intellectual property protection. Indeed, the criteria
identified in the ex ante rebuttal case show that that industry required
protection. Semiconductors are costly to develop, and are easily and
cheaply imitated, and as a result the market would not generate
incentives to innovation without intellectual property protection.'63
Congress gave it the protection it required in the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act. '6 Perhaps Carrier means that patents are not essential to
innovation in the semiconductor industry because that industry has other
forms of intellectual property protection. Indeed, it is unclear how a
plaintiff attempting to prove the ex ante issues could succeed in that
industry.
3. The McGowan Approach
McGowan's contribution is to focus our attention on, first, a respect
for the right of exclusion conferred by intellectual property law and then,
second, upon the efficiency norm underlying antitrust law. His analysis
properly gives precedence to intellectual property law's right of
exclusion. Anything else would be to eviscerate intellectual property
law. Here his analysis is a corrective to those of Patterson and Carrier.
Each of these scholars seeks ways of shrinking intellectual property
protection from that literally provided by the statute. Patterson's
distinction between the invention and the product in which the invention
is embodied would reduce intellectual property protection, even in
circumstances which Congress twice revisited in its enactment and
amendment of section 271. Carrier would reduce intellectual property
protection by identifying industries in which his proposed procedural
test would show that this protection was not needed or only minimally
needed. In their different ways Patterson and Carrier thus would support
160. See Carrier, supra note 1, at 826, 828, 831 n.305, 838 n.330, 844, 851, 853.
161. See id. at 831 n.305, 838 n.330.
162. Patents may have acquired increased importance in the semiconductor industry. See
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE L.J. 1575, 1597, 1606 & n.150 (2002).
163. See id. at 1595, 1603-07 (discussing the need for intellectual property protection in the
semiconductor industry); H.R. Rep. No. 98-781 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750,
5751-52.
164. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (2000).
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an antitrust encroachment into patent (and presumably all intellectual
property) law. McGowan, however, would tolerate antitrust inroads only
at the margins of intellectual property protection, thus showing that he
takes both intellectual property and antitrust policies seriously. Yet his
balancing at the margins does raise some issues that he leaves open.
Under the McGowan approach, the effects of a sale or license beyond
pure exclusion are to be evaluated under an efficiency norm. Since much
antitrust analysis incorporates a short-term efficiency analysis, it is
unclear whether McGowan is subjecting the long-term goals of
intellectual property to a short-term analysis. Moreover, it is unclear how
his approach here fits with his clear preference for the long term
embodied in his evaluation of serial monopoly in network markets.
Despite questions or doubts about some aspects of each of these
approaches to the antitrust/intellectual property interface, it is
remarkable in how much they agree. All of the commentators seek to
reconcile antitrust and intellectual property law by identifying and
immunizing transactions in which core intellectual property concerns are
triggered. Patterson does this with his focus on invention. Carrier does
this with his focus upon where the market failure, that is the raison
d'etre of intellectual property protection, does and does not occur.
McGowan does this when he insists that pure exclusion can never be
subject to antitrust challenge. This concern of the commentators with
identifying the core of intellectual property rights and giving them
precedence over antitrust policies is an approach that the courts are
themselves discovering and gradually adopting as the discussion below
shows.
VI.

DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYRIGHT

In 1990, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the doctrine of copyright
misuse, a doctrine about whose existence earlier cases had speculated
from time to time. In Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 65 Holliday
Steel, the corporate defendant, licensed four copies of the plaintiff
Lasercomb's copyrighted CAD/CAM die-making software. Holliday
Steel then proceeded, not only to make unauthorized copies of the
software but to incorporate the plaintiff's software into its own software
program which it then marketed to others. The court ruled that Holliday
Steel had not only engaged in unauthorized copying but had surrounded
its copying with a number of deceptive practices designed to obscure
that unlawful behavior. Nonetheless, the court ruled that the plaintiff
165.

911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Lasercomb was barred from enforcing its copyrights because it was
misusing them. Lasercomb was contractually requiring the licensees of
its die-making software to abstain from developing their own diemaking software during the term of the license and for an additional
year. The district court had viewed this provision as a reasonable
protection against copying, but the court of appeals took a different
view. The appellate court viewed this provision as an attempt to use its
copyright to control competition in an area outside the area of copyright
protection. '66
A number of facets of the Lasercomb opinion are of interest. First,
the court followed the patent cases in determining that misuse consisted
of using intellectual property rights to exert control outside of the area
which those rights encompassed, i.e., in leveraging the power conferred
by the intellectual property right to control market behavior beyond the
scope of those rights. Second, the court criticized the lower court for
viewing the offending contractual provisions as a reasonable way of
protecting against copying. In the appellate court's view, there is no
analogue to the rule of reason in dealing with a misuse issue. Reasoning
that a party could misuse its intellectual property rights without
necessarily violating the antitrust law, the court concluded that the
misuse doctrine imposes stricter constraints on behavior than does
antitrust. Accordingly, the rule of reason, which is an antitrust defense,
does not excuse misuse. Stated another way, there is no rule of reason in
misuse analysis. One misuses by leveraging, however reasonable that
leveraging may be. As I note below, this rejection of the rule of reason
exacerbates the differences between copyright misuse and patent misuse.
Third, the court's rationale for adopting a copyright misuse doctrine was
ostensibly based upon the similarities between patent law (which
contains a misuse doctrine) and copyright law. The court found these
similarities in their development in seventeenth and eighteenth century
England, the similar treatment of patents and copyrights in the U.S.
Constitution, and the equation of the public policies behind patents and
copyrights by the Supreme Court. 167 Despite this multi-pronged rationale,
the court embraced a copyright misuse doctrine whose parameters
appear to be quite different from those of the patent misuse doctrine.
The court barely mentioned the statutory limits which Congress has
placed on the patent misuse doctrine.'68 Under the Fourth Circuit's
rationale, one might expect that the judicially created doctrine of
166. See id. at 971-79.
167. See id. at 976-78.
168. See id. at 975-76.
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copyright misuse-based, as it is, upon its patent analogue-would
incorporate the carefully constructed legislative provisions governing
patent misuse. Moreover, the Federal Circuit, which decides all patent
appeals, requires that an anticompetitive effect, i.e., a restraint that
cannot be justified under the rule of reason, be established as a predicate
to a determination of misuse.'69
The cases which have followed Lasercomb have elaborated the
misuse doctrine, finding it applicable whenever a copyright holder
imposes a restraint beyond a mere license to use. Perhaps the most
stringent application of the misuse doctrine occurred in Practice
Management Information Co. v. American Medical Ass'n 7° ("AMA"),
where an exclusive-supply provision in a license agreement was held to
constitute misuse. In that case the AMA developed a coding system for
identifying medical procedures which was published in a document
entitled the Physician's Current Procedural Terminology ("CPT") and
on which the AMA held a copyright. When the federal Health Care
Financing Administration ("HCFA") needed a code for identifying
physicians' services for use in Medicare and Medicaid administration,
the HCFA sought and obtained a license from the AMA to use its
copyrighted CPT. Because the AMA's license required the HCFA "'not
to use any other system of procedur[al] nomenclature,"' the court
concluded that the AMA misused its copyright.' 7 ' This holding gives
literal effect to the Lasercomb approach which equates misuse with an
exertion of control beyond the literal scope of the copyright. The First
Circuit, in Data General Corp. v. Grumman System Support Corp.,"'
appears to have grasped the revolutionary aspects of this approach to
copyright misuse. Yet it is an approach whose ramifications may not,
even now, be fully appreciated in the other circuits and in the bar
generally.
Agreements under which a copyright licensee confines itself to the
licensor's product would not only be unenforceable, but the licensor
169. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Windsurfing
Int'l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
170. 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997).
171. Id.at517-21.
172. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). In that case the court observed that section 271(d) bars a
patent misuse determination when the patentee has unilaterally refused a license. The court then
suggested that the effect of section 271(d) may be to bar all antitrust claims and counterclaims
premised on a refusal to license a patent. The court then noted that there was no copyright analogue
to section 271(d). In order to preserve the economic incentives engendered by the Copyright Act,
however, the court ruled that the desire of a copyright holder to exclude others from the use of its
copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business justification for refusing to license. See id.
at 1187.
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would be barred from enforcing its copyright against anyone.'73 The
Lasercomb rationale would apparently undermine exclusive-supply
contracts between motion-picture distributors and theaters, as well as all
exclusive-supply contracts involving software. Indeed, many or most of
the contracts that were the subject of the Justice Department's antitrust
suits against the Microsoft Corporation may have been vulnerable to
assertions of copyright misuse. Microsoft's exclusive contracts with
original equipment manufacturers that were the subject of litigation in
the mid-1990s would have been vulnerable. 17 4 So would have been the
exclusive and near-exclusive licenses that the Microsoft Corporation had
entered into with Internet Access Providers and which were the subject
of a second costly antitrust suit brought by the Department.'75 Not only
were those licenses unenforceable, but the Microsoft copyrights
employed in those licenses were apparently unenforceable against
anyone!
The Ninth Circuit has suggested in dicta that it might be willing to
extend the copyright misuse doctrine a step further than the other
circuits. In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 176 the
court laid the groundwork for this expansion. In this case, the court
indicated that, although a unilateral refusal to license was a
presumptively lawful act, it might nevertheless give rise to antitrust
liability if that presumption were overcome. 77 In A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc.' 71 that court expanded that antitrust approach into the area
of copyright misuse, suggesting that a unilateral refusal to license a
copyright could constitute misuse. '79
The Ninth Circuit's suggestion that a unilateral refusal to license
might constitute misuse, of course, is the most recent extension of the
copyright misuse doctrine beyond its asserted rationale. In Lasercomb
the court had justified incorporating a misuse doctrine into copyright law
on the ground that such a doctrine existed in patent law and that patent
and copyright laws shared many commonalities."o Yet on that
justification, the copyright misuse doctrine would be expected to be
similar to the patent misuse doctrine. And the patent misuse doctrine is
173.
174.
T 71,096,
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 94-1564LO, 1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
75, 244-46 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1995).
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
See id. at 1218-19.
239 F.3d 1004, 1027 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001).
See id. at 1027 n.8.
See Lasercomb Am. Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973-74 (4th Cir. 1990).
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largely legislatively defined in section 271. In fact, however, the
Lasercomb decision has taken copyright down a route that is quite
different from its supposed patent analogue. Section 271 protects a
patentee's refusal to license. And, as observed above, a patentee cannot
be found to have misused its patent unless its behavior has transgressed
the rule of reason.
Yet the Ninth Circuit is not without support in thinking about a
unilateral refusal to license as copyright misuse. The First Circuit
opinion in Data General notes that "while Section 271 (d) is indicative of
congressional 'policy' on the need for antitrust law to accommodate
intellectual property law, Congress did not similarly amend the
Copyright Act."'' 8 ' Although the court in that passage is concerned with
an antitrust issue, it is also considering the effect of section 271. The
court's language suggests that the enactment of legislation restricting the
scope of patent misuse and the absence of legislation restricting the
scope of copyright misuse implies that the copyright misuse doctrine is,
or may be, more expansive than patent misuse. Perhaps. But if the very
existence of a copyright misuse doctrine is justified on analogues to the
patent law, then the limitations on patent misuse should be important
factors to consider in determining the scope of copyright misuse. Indeed,
this conclusion is supported by the history of the patent misuse doctrine.
Section 271, it will be recalled, was enacted to curb judicial zeal in
expanding the patent misuse doctrine. It would be unfortunate if the
judiciary expanded the copyright misuse doctrine without reflecting on
that history.
The most interesting developments under the copyright misuse
doctrine, however, have involved the use of copyrighted software
programs to control various aftermarkets. The Eastman Kodak and Data
General cases referred to above involved such behavior. The
development of the copyright misuse doctrine in this context is
described in the next section. Here, we should observe merely that the
Fifth Circuit, in Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Technologies, Inc.,'82 has
applied the misuse doctrine to prevent the holder of a manufacturer of
telephone switching systems to control the market for expansion cards
through its copyright over the operating system used in the switching
systems. In that case DSC Communications Corp., the manufacturer of
the switching systems, licensed the use of a copyrighted operating
system to customers. By limiting the license to use only on DSC181. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
182. 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999).
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manufactured equipment, a customer who installed expansion cards
manufactured by others would infringe DSC's copyright when the
system began to operate and the copyrighted operating system was
reproduced in the memories of the expansion cards. The court held,
however, that by licensing in this way, DSC was engaged in copyright
misuse, because it was attempting to control the market for expansion
cards, a market which lay beyond the scope of its copyright. As a result,
the court refused enforcement to DSC's copyrighted program.'8 3
VII. COPYRIGHT AND AFTERMARKETS
The use of copyright to control aftermarkets began shortly after the
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. " Kodak, a manufacturer of high speed copiers
and micrographic equipment, had refused to sell replacement parts to
ISOs. As a result, only Kodak servicing organizations were able to
provide maintenance and repair. ISOs charged that Kodak had
effectively tied maintenance and repair service to replacement parts, thus
engaging in unlawful tying and monopolization.'85 After the ISOs
prevailed in the Supreme Court, it appeared that equipment
manufacturers would be unable to control the servicing and other
aftermarkets for their products. As the caselaw has revealed, however,
the Court's decision is not nearly as broad as some observers initially
feared. So long as a manufacturer makes clear to all of its customers that
replacement parts will be available only from it and maintains that
policy unchanged from the beginning, then it will avoid the prohibition
against monopolization as well as the application of the per se rule
against tying. 18 It will avoid conflict with these antitrust rules, because
by making its policy clear at the beginning, the manufacturer will have
succeeded in bringing the aftermarket into the equipment market,
constraining its power in the former by competition in the latter.
Customers decide, when they purchase the equipment, whether they are
willing to accept the manufacturer's exclusive maintenance and repair
services.
In the immediate aftermath of the Eastman Kodak decision,
however, some manufacturers looked to copyright as a promising means
of providing exclusive access to service aftermarkets. In MAI Systems
183.
184.
185.
186.

See id. at 782, 793, 799.
504 U.S. 451 (1992).
See id. at 455, 459.
See PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.,187 the Ninth Circuit ruled that when a
computer reproduces a copyrighted software program in its random
access memory (RAM), that reproduction constitutes a "copy" for
purposes of the copyright law. In that case, MAI Systems sold
computers and licensed the use of its operating system to its computer
customers "solely to fulfill [the] Customer's own internal information
processing needs."'88 When a technician from Peak, an ISO, turned on a
customer's computer, the technician activated the operating system
which was reproduced in the computer's RAM. In addition, the
technician viewed the system's error log, which was part of the
operating system, to diagnose the problem requiring attention. By thus
loading the operating system into the computer's memory, the technician
produced an unauthorized copy of the operating system, thus infringing
MAI's copyright.'89
Section 11 7 of the Copyright Act was designed to deal with the fact
that computers reproduce software programs in their RAMs when they
use them. That section authorizes the owner of a copy of a computer
program to make a new copy "as an essential step in the utilization of the
computer program."' 90 Section 117, accordingly, ensures that an owner
of a copy of a computer program does not infringe when she uses the
program.' 9' But the protection is accorded only to the "owner" and not to
a lessee."' In MAI, the court, relying upon licensing agreements from
MAI to its customers, ruled that the customers did not own copies of the
copyrighted operating systems.'93 Therefore, they could not claim the
protection of Section 117. No argument was thus available that the
action of the Peak technician fell within the owner's safety net provided
by Section 117. The Ninth Circuit later reaffirmed its MAI decision in
Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co. 94 that replication of a
software program in a computer's RAM was a copy for purposes of the
copyright act.' 95 In 1997, the Second Circuit also suggested that it was
likely to follow that approach in FonarCorp. v. Domenick. 96

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 520 U.S. 1033 (1994).
See MAI, 991 F.2dat517n.3.
See id. at 518.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
See id.
See id.
See MAI, 991 F.2d at 517 n.3, 518 n.5.
64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
See id. at 1335.
105 F.3d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Congress responded to MAI, Triad and Fonar in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act.' 97 That Act added paragraphs (c) and (d) to
section 117, expressly allowing the owner or lessee of a machine to
make, or authorize the making of, a copy of a computer program when
the copy is made solely by activation of a machine that is being repaired
or maintained.'98 While Congress thus rejected the holding of MAI and
its progeny as applied to ISOs, it did not repudiate MAI's general
holding that the reproduction of a computer program in RAM created a
copy for purposes of copyright law. Even when the narrowly tailored
language of the new paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 117 became
effective, therefore, it could not protect rivals in markets other than
service or maintenance.
Litigation involving DSC Communications Corporation has
highlighted the limited scope of the legislative overruling of MAI. As
described in the prior section, DSC produces telephone switching
systems for sale to long-distance telephone companies and leases copies
of the copyrighted operating system employed by the switching systems
to its customers. The switching systems are expandable with the addition
of expansion cards. DSC, however, prevents rivals from supplying
expansion cards for use with its system through the ownership of the
copyright in the operating system. Since DSC's customers own the
equipment but not the copies of the operating system supplied with that
equipment, their reproduction of the operating system is governed by the
lease contract rather than section 117. Since the lease confines the use of
the operating system to DSC-supplied equipment, the reproduction of
DSC's operating system in the RAM of expansion cards made by DSC's
rivals constitutes unauthorized copying and thus infringement. A DSC
customer who used an expansion card supplied by a rival would thus
commit an act of direct infringement. And the rival which supplied the
card would be a contributory infringer.
The Fifth Circuit, however, while concluding that DSC's customers
were direct infringers and that the rival supplier was a contributory
infringer, nonetheless refused to enforce DSC's copyright on the ground
that it was misusing its copyrights.' 99 According to the Fifth Circuit,
DSC's attempt to use its copyright on the operating system to control the
market for its uncopyrighted expansion cards constituted misuse. ° In so
197.
amended
198.
199.
200.

See Pub. L. 105-304, Title I1, § 302, Oct. 28, 1998, 112 Stat. 2886 (1998) (codified as
at 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)).
See id.§ 117 (2001).
See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 722, 793 (5th Cir. 1999).
See id.
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doing, it was leveraging its copyright into a market beyond the scope of
its copyright. Under Lasercomb, that behavior constitutes misuse.
VIII. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MISUSE ISSUE
We have already reviewed the rationale employed by the Fourth
Circuit in Lasercomb to create the modern copyright misuse doctrine.
That rationale suggests that the copyright misuse doctrine should be
limited analogously to the way the patent misuse doctrine is limited
under section 271 of the Patent Act. We have observed the statement in
Data General attributing significance to the failure of the Congress to
amend the copyright act to create analogues to section 271. But in the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the Congress did legislate
specifically with respect to the use of copyright as a tie to control an
aftermarket. 21 In its amendments to section 117, Congress formulated a
more precise policy about the use of copyrighted software as a tying
product. Congress, in effect, told us that a copyrighted software program
which is activated whenever equipment is turned on may not be
leveraged to control the market for maintenance and repair services of
that machine. But explicit congressional restriction on software
leveraging was limited to this narrow (maintenance and repair) context.
One interpretation of these events is that the copyright on software
may legitimately be leveraged to secure control over all aftermarkets
other than maintenance and repair. The narrow language which Congress
chose to overrule the MAI line of cases suggests that Congress has
implicitly approved the copyright leveraging in other contexts.
Moreover, its failure to disapprove the holding in MAI and other cases
that the replication of a program in RAM constitutes a copy for
copyright law purposes lends additional support to this interpretation.
This aspect of the MAI decision was both widely criticized and widely
followed. Had Congress wished to contain the MAI ruling more broadly,
it could have amended the definition of "copy" to exclude temporary
RAM copies. An alternative interpretation of these events, of course, is
that the narrow language contained in the amendments to section 117 is
tailored to the problem perceived by the Congress (and as probably
identified to it by independent servicing organizations and their
lobbyists). Under this interpretation, the failure of Congress to enact
more sweeping legislation carries no implications at all. Congress just
did not focus on any problem other than the complaints of the ISOs.

201.

See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).
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IX.
A.

ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS

The Antitrust/IntellectualProperty Interfaces

While both the Clayton Act and section 271 are relevant inputs in
determining the parameters of the antitrust/patent law interface, recent
cases have addressed not only the interface between the antitrust and
patent law but also the interface between antitrust and copyright law.
The leading case is probably In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust' Litigation20 2 in which the Federal Circuit ruled that, absent
unusual circumstances, a patent grant contemplates the right to exclude
competition in more than one market.203 Following B. Braun Medical,
Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,which had held that a patentee had a right to
exclude competition in both the market for patented valves and the
market for extension sets incorporating the patented valves, ° the court
ruled that Xerox, a manufacturer of copying equipment, lawfully refused
to sell parts to independent servicing organizations. 5 Indeed, its refusal
fell squarely within the permission of section 271(d)(4) .2 The plaintiffs'
contention that Xerox was leveraging its power in the parts market into
the service market was rejected on the ground that Xerox was not
extending its power beyond the scope of its patent; 7 rather, the patent
conferred a right to exclude in any market in which the parts were sold
or used, including the service market.0 8
202. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001).
203. See id. at 1327.
204. See 124 F.3d 1419, 1427 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
205. See In re Ind.Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1328.
206. See id. at 1326.
207. See id. at 1322, 1326-27.
208. See id. at 1327. The decision involving Xerox appears to resolve the antitrust issue which
arose in C.R. Bard. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
petitionsfor rehearingand rehearing en banc denied, 161 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Bard held a
patent on a device for injecting needles into body tissue in order to sample tissue for biopsy
purposes. Bard modified the design of that device (or biopsy gun) in order to prevent competitors
from providing replacement needles for Bard biopsy guns. By a 2-1 vote, the court upheld a jury
determination that by modifying the biopsy guns to prevent competitors from supplying needles for
them, Bard unlawfully maintained its needle monopoly. See C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1346, 1382. In a
concurring opinion accompanying the court's denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc, Judges
Gajarsa and Clevenger pointed out that the defendant had not argued that "modification of a
patented product within the scope of the claims by a patentee can not, as a matter of law, constitute
an antitrust violation," and thus, that issue had not been before the court. C.R. Bard, 161 F.3d at
1380. In their view, the decision left that question open for future resolution. See id. at 1381. A
somewhat analogous issue arose in the Microsoft antitrust litigation, where the circuit ruled that
Microsoft's decisions about how to design a copyrighted product could constitute antitrust
violations if they helped to preserve its monopoly and could not be justified on efficiency grounds.
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The Federal Circuit applied a similar approach to uphold Xerox's
refusal to sell copyrighted manuals for its machines to ISOs and its
refusal to license those organizations to use its diagnostic software.
Following an earlier decision of the First Circuit,2 ° the court ruled that
an author's desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a
presumptively valid business justification for a refusal to license or sell
its copyrighted manuals and diagnostic software." °
The presumptive validity of exclusion under both patent and
copyright laws could be rebutted, the Federal Circuit said, by proof that
the intellectual property rights holder had obtained the protection of the
intellectual property laws unlawfully or was enforcing them
unlawfully. 2 ' To rebut the presumptive validity of exclusion under the
patent laws, the plaintiff would have to show that the patent was
obtained by fraud on the patent office2' 2 or that the enforcement of the
patents constituted shams under the Noerr doctrine. 2 ' To rebut the
presumptive validity of exclusion under the copyright laws, the plaintiff
would have to show that the copyright was obtained unlawfully or that
the copyrights were used to gain monopoly power beyond the statutory
copyright grant.2' 4 The Ninth Circuit, however, in a 1997 decision. 5
ruled that both the patent and copyright presumptions could be
overcome by a showing that the rights holder's decision to exploit its
intellectual property rights was a pretext to mask anticompetitive
conduct.2 6 In its recent decision, the Federal Circuit rejected that
position as undermining the purposes of those laws.2 7
This split between the Federal and Ninth Circuits reflects the
tension between antitrust and intellectual property law. The Ninth
Thus Microsoft's decision to commingle code of its browser and operating system and to remove
the browser from its add/remove program were ruled unlawful. See United States v. Microsoft
Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
209. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994).
210. See CSU, 203 F.3d at 1326, 1329 (quoting Data Gen. Corp. 36 F.3d at 1187).
211. See CSU, 203 F.3d at 1326.
212. See id.; Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965).
213. See CSU, 203 F.3d at 1326; E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961). The application of the Noerr doctrine to the enforcement of intellectual
property rights is tested by standards set out in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). Under the latter case, a plaintiff's motivation in
asserting a copyright claim is irrelevant unless the copyright claim is objectively baseless. See id.
at 60.
214. See CSU, 203 F.3d at 1329.
215. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
216. See id. at 1219.
217. See CSU, 203 F.3d at 1327, 1329.

20021

THE ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTERFACE

Circuit appears to be following in the tradition of Mercoid and other
cases which subordinated intellectual property rights to undefined, openended and therefore unpredictable antitrust policies. The Federal
Circuit's approach appears administratively superior to that of the Ninth
Circuit because it carries a greater potential for consistent application. In
permitting the finder of fact to inquire into the subjective motivations of
the intellectual property right holder in order to determine whether the
assertion of intellectual property rights was or was not a "pretext" for
imposing a market restraint, the Ninth Circuit has abandoned
predictability as a goal. Since the purpose of intellectual property rights
is to exclude, it is unclear why the motivation of the rights holder is a
relevant concern. Moreover, since attributing a motivation to a
corporation or other business institution is an uncertain task at best, the
Ninth Circuit's approach appears to be unduly error-prone.
When it made the defendant's subjective motivation the critical
issue, the Ninth Circuit departed from the trend towards more objective
standards in antitrust generally and in the antitrust/intellectual property
interface particularly. Thus, the importance of objective evidence in
antitrust contexts was emphasized in comparatively recent cases such as
Spectrum Sports and Brooke Group.2 8 And, in the antitrust/intellectual
property context, ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, Inc.2'9 has similarly
emphasized the importance of objective standards. Indeed, in the latter
case, the Court ruled that so long as its intellectual property claim is
objectively plausible, the holder is entitled to assert it.220 And, in those
circumstances, its subjective motivation is irrelevant.
The Microsoft antitrust litigation has added a further gloss upon
what may prove to be an emerging synthesis of antitrust law with patent
and copyright laws. The district court's resolution of the copyright issues
in Microsoft followed the Ninth Circuit's approach in Kodak.22 ' But the
district court decision was reversed by the D.C. Circuit, which
formulated its own approach to copyright issues. In that case, Microsoft
had contended that copyright law conferred upon it the unrestricted

218. See generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
219. See Prof'] Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1993). In areas of intellectual property law outside of the antitrust context, the Court has also been
emphasizing an objective approach. See Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 36 (1997) (holding that intent plays no role in applying the doctrine of equivalents in
patent law).
220. See Prof'l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 65.
221. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2000).
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power to use its rights any way that it wished.2 The court rejected that
position summarily, referring to it as one that "borders upon the
frivolous.

223

Rather, in a context in which copyright and antitrust

policies appear to conflict, the court's approach gives effect to copyright
policies only when the rights holder is able to convince the court that a
substantial policy concern underlying the copyright law is involved.
In the case, the lawfulness of several restrictions imposed upon
original equipment manufacturers ("OEMs") was before the court. The
district court had condemned provisions prohibiting the OEMs from
"(1) removing any desktop icons, folders, or 'Start' menu entries;
(2) altering the initial boot sequence; and (3) otherwise altering the
appearance of the Windows desktop. '224 The appellate court agreed that
these restrictions were prima facie anticompetitive because they impeded
OEMs from distributing browsers other than Microsoft's Internet
Explorer and thus impeded Netscape from maintaining the critical mass
of installed browsers essential to providing middleware competition to
Microsoft's Windows operating system.22 5 The appellate court then
evaluated Microsoft's asserted justifications for these prima facie
anticompetitive restrictions. In evaluating Microsoft's proffered
copyright justifications, the court took a sophisticated approach,
examining those justifications that raised substantial copyright concerns.
Thus, although the court regarded Microsoft's contention that copyright
law conferred upon it the right to impose any restriction it wanted in a
licensing agreement as essentially frivolous, 22 6 the court approached
other proffered justifications differently. The court agreed with
Microsoft that a replacement of the Windows desktop with a user
interface designed by the OEM or with a Netscape user interface was "a
drastic alteration" of Microsoft's copyrighted work and "outweighs the
marginal anticompetitive effect of prohibiting the OEMs from
substituting a different interface automatically upon completion of the
initial boot process., 227 The court also agreed in principle that it would
be lawful for Microsoft to bar alterations of Windows that would
undermine its "value ... as a stable and consistent platform., 228 It
rejected that rationale for Microsoft's license restrictions, however,

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 46, 62-63 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 61.
See id.
See id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.
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because Microsoft had not shown that the "stability" and "consistency"
of the Windows platform were threatened.229
B.

Technological Tying

The D.C. Circuit ruled that it was prima facie lawful for Microsoft
to integrate its Intemet Explorer into its Windows operating system so
long as OEMs and others were able to disintegrate the products. It would
be lawful even to integrate the two products so tightly that disintegration
was impossible, if the preclusion of disintegration was grounded in
efficiency. 230 Thus, the court ruled that Microsoft's exclusion of the
browser from the add/remove program was unlawful, because there was
no efficiency reason underlying that exclusion. It was also unlawful for
Microsoft to prevent disintegration by unnecessarily commingling
browser and operating system code in the same files, because there was
no efficiency reason for the commingling.23 ' By contrast, the court
upheld Microsoft's action in causing Windows to override the user's
choice of a default browser in a number of circumstances in which the
default browser would be incompatible with Windows devices with
which it was being employed.232 Microsoft proffered no efficiency
justification for the first two technological constraints on user choice,
but did proffer one for the latter. When, as on this issue, Microsoft
provided an efficiency justification for a constraint, the court required
the plaintiff to disprove that justification. The failure of the plaintiff to
come forward to disprove the justification allowed Microsoft to prevail
on that issue.233
Let me restate these matters in the language of copyright. When
Microsoft integrated its browser into its operating system, it created a
derivative work.234 Perhaps if that work were understood as a union of an
operating system and a browser, it would also constitute a compilation.23
229. See id. at 64.
230. See id. at 85-86 (discussing the court's "separate-products" test that prohibits tying
arrangements if efficiency and demand tests are met).
231. See id. at 66-67.
232. See id. at 67. The court thought that when a user invoked certain means of accessing the
Intemet where the Windows 98 Help system and the Windows Update feature were in play, it was
appropriate to override a choice of Navigator since the latter did not support ActiveX controls on
which those features depended. Accessing the Internet through the My Computer or Windows
Explorer routes would also be inconsistent with the use of such a default browser since the purposes
of those features was to enable users to move seamlessly from local storage devices to the Web
within the same browsing window. See id.
233. See id.
234. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
235. See id.
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Under the court's antitrust ruling, the copyright owner was required to
permit licensees to disassemble that compilation and to undo the
modifications which changed the preexisting works into a derivative
work.
C. The Court's Overall Technique
In its Microsoft decision, the D.C. Circuit applied a shifting-burden
approach to the resolution of antitrust issues, including those in which
the defendant relied upon copyright as all or part of its justification.
When the court identified a restraint that it believed to be prima facie
anticompetitive, it required the defendant to justify it. When the
defendant proffered a plausible justification, the court required the
plaintiff to disprove the justification."' A major attraction of this
approach is that it provides a detailed framework for exploring the
effects and rationales for the restrictions in issue, compelling the parties
to prepare highly structured cases and to meet the precise contentions of
their opponents on a host of sub-issues.
This approach, however, appears at base to be a balancing one,
where the court assesses the strength of the justification against the
competitive restraint. Thus when the court upheld Microsoft's
prohibition on replacing the Windows user interface, it said that the
protection of the copyrighted work "outweighs the marginal
anticompetitive effect" of prohibiting the OEMs from substituting a
different interface.237 On its face, this is the language of balancing. Yet
the Federal Circuit, in Xerox, appeared to avoid balancing by accepting a
copyright justification as trumping antitrust concerns unless the
copyright was shown to have been obtained fraudulently or was being
abused under the objective standards of the Noerr doctrine. Are the
approaches of the D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit then in fact
inconsistent?
One way of reading the D.C. Circuit opinion is to read the language
referring to balancing as (1) not endorsing balancing in the conventional
sense at all but (2) merely the court's way of describing its approach to
reconciling copyright and antitrust concerns, an approach which in fact
preserves the advantages of objectivity in much the same way as the
Noerr doctrine preserves them. Under this reading, the balance to which
the court refers is not to a subjective (to the judge) finely-tuned weighing
of the case-specific claims of copyright against the case-specific claims
236. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
237. Id. at 63.

2002]

THE ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INTERFACE

of antitrust, but rather it is a determination whether copyright policy is
implicated at all because of the presence of a substantial copyright
concern. Once the court determines that a substantial copyright concern
is present-as the court did, for example, in its ruling protecting the
Windows user interface from a "substantial alteration" 23"-then it no
longer is engaged in any balance whatsoever. It then enforces the
copyright.
This way of reading the D.C. Circuit opinion follows Noerr and its
manifestation in the intellectual property/antitrust context in
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc."' In ProfessionalReal Estate, the Court looked only to see whether
there was an objective basis for a lawsuit alleging copyright
infringement. 210 Once the court determined that an objective basis
existed, the right to enforce copyright prevailed over any antitrust
concerns. On this analogy, once the D.C. Circuit determined that there
was a substantial copyright concern (as in the Windows user interface
issue described above), copyright law policies prevailed over antitrust
concerns. For reasons set forth immediately below plus reasons that I
will articulate subsequently, I believe that this is the proper way to
understand the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft opinion.
The D.C. Circuit was conscious of the dangers that subjectivity
poses to decisional consistency. First, it deprecated the value of intent
evidence. Its focus was on conduct not intent, the court said.24 Intent was
relevant only to the extent that it is helpful in understanding the likely
effect of conduct. Second, the D.C. Circuit's decision reversed a
decision below in which the district court judge had explicitly endorsed
the Ninth Circuit's position subordinating copyright concerns to antitrust
policies when the court finds that copyright is being employed as a
pretext to restrain trade.242 The Ninth Circuit had opted to let the
antitrust/copyright interface depend upon the defendant's subjective
intent. The D.C. Circuit's different approach brings it closer to that of
the Federal Circuit's explicit rejection of subjective intent as a means for
24 3
determining whether antitrust or copyright policy trumps the other.
Finally, as noted above, the trend in antitrust cases over at least the last
decade has been towards objective standards. Reading the D.C. Circuit's

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See id.
508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993).
See id.
See 253 F.3d at 59.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41 (D.D.C. 2000).
See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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Microsoft opinion in the way I have suggested would best harmonize it
with this approach.
X.

AN EMERGING SYNTHESIS

The Federal Circuit's view is that the exercise of intellectual
property rights cannot violate the antitrust laws. Its rationale is that
intellectual property rights are rights to exclude. Congress created those
rights as exceptions to antitrust law. The Federal Circuit thus is opposed
to balancing intellectual property policies against antitrust policies,
because Congress has already performed that balance and opted for
intellectual property rights. For the same reasons, the Federal Circuit
also rejects the use of the subjective intent of the actor as helpful in
determining whether the antitrust laws should prevail over intellectual
property rights.'" Behavior which falls within the scope of intellectual
property rights is protected. To weigh conflicting antitrust and
intellectual property policies on a case-by-case basis or to permit
intellectual property protection to depend upon an actor's subjective
intent would undermine public confidence in the intellectual property
laws and thus erode the innovation incentives that they are designed to
engender. In the view of the Federal Circuit, Xerox was within its rights
to refuse to sell patented parts to ISOs and to refuse to license them to
use its copyrighted manuals and copyrighted diagnostic software
programs because patent and copyright laws gave it exclusive control
over its intellectual property. Xerox was not "extending" its patents or
copyrights beyond their terms, because the powers that it was exercising
were squarely within the scope of the rights conferred under those laws.
It was not unlawfully extending patents or copyrights into additional
markets, because the rights conferred under those laws included the right
to control the protected intellectual property in all of the markets in
which the property had commercial value.
In my view the approach of the Federal Circuit, broadly understood,
has much to recommend. Its rejection of subjective intent and implicitly
of case-by-case weighing of antitrust policies against intellectual
property policies, brings greater predictability to the law, heightens the
sense of order, and minimizes the role of judicial or jury discretion. The
decision nonetheless requires some modest correction. The Federal
Circuit's basic insight-that what is protected by the intellectual
property laws cannot be vitiated by the subjective intent of the actor or
by the case-specific policy preferences of the judge-will ultimately be
244. See id. at 1327, 1329.
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accepted by all circuits, for both pragmatic and idealistic reasons: it is
both more workable than the alternatives and it moves us closer to
governance by a rule-of-law in the intellectual property/antitrust
interface.
Yet the Federal Circuit's approach does require correction, because
it fails to recognize the limitations on intellectual property rights
inherent in the intellectual property laws themselves. When the Federal
Circuit opinion recognized Xerox's right to employ its copyrighted
diagnostic software to exclude ISOs from the aftermarket, it made no
mention of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act's overruling of the
MAI line of cases.2 45 Although the events in Xerox preceded that 1998
legislation, 246 and the Xerox manuals were outside the reach of that
legislation, it would have been well for the court to have acknowledged
its existence. Moreover, the recent adoption of the copyright misuse
doctrine by several circuits 247 has also cast doubt upon whether
copyrighted software can legitimately be used to capture an aftermarket
for servicing. The Fifth Circuit in Alcatel USA24' refused to allow the use
of a copyrighted software program to exclude competition in an
aftermarket in expansion cards, a decision not easily reconciled with the
Federal Circuit's tolerance of Xerox's use of copyright to exclude the
ISOs.
I suggest that the decisional lines represented by Xerox, Alcatel, and
Microsoft can be reconciled in a new synthesis as follows: Patent and
copyright laws trump antitrust law when the behavior at issue falls
within the scope of the rights granted under those laws. Patent and
copyright laws confer exclusive rights and the exercise of those rights
cannot violate antitrust law. This approach is fully consistent with the
widely accepted position that the patent law does not give anyone the
right to violate the antitrust laws. The patent law merely (but essentially)
confers exclusive rights. Sometimes those exclusive rights may
constitute an economic monopoly. In that case, the patent law confers a
monopoly, but because the monopoly is granted by law, it is a lawful
monopoly and does not violate the antitrust laws. But patent holders run
the risk of violating the antitrust laws, if they combine together to create
245. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
246. See generally In re Indep. Servs. Org. Antitrust Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (D. Kan.
1998) (providing relevant dates).
247. See Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999); Practice Mgmt.
Info. Co. v. AMA, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970
(4th Cir. 1990); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir.
1994).
248. See Alcatel USA, 166 F.3d at 777, 784.
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There is nothing in patent law sanctioning agreements

among several patent holders to combine their patents. When they do so,
they may therefore unlawfully monopolize.
We actually know quite a bit about the scope of the various
exclusive rights under patent law, because Congress has elaborated them
in section 271 of the Patent Act. In those provisions, Congress has told
us what a patentee may lawfully do without making itself vulnerable to a
charge of misuse. The misuse doctrine developed out of a judicial
concern that patents not be employed anticompetitively. The
legislatively-set limits on the misuse doctrine surely ought to guide us
when we inquire whether a patentee's use of its patent is consistent with
the antitrust laws. Thus, for example, the tying of a nonstaple product to
a patent is not misuse under section 271, and it should not constitute an
antitrust violation either. This is the Federal Circuit's position: the
exercise of rights conferred by section 271 cannot violate the antitrust
laws.
Copyright law differs from patent law in that there is no analogue
to section 271 governing copyright misuse. The cases from several
circuits tell us that the use of copyright to effect a tie constitutes
misuse. 2 ' Thus, if tying is effectively precluded under copyright law
itself, then the Federal Circuit in Xerox should not have permitted the tie
under the guise of giving effect to copyright law.
Microsoft contributes the additional consideration that before
copyright law is brought into play, the court should determine that a
serious copyright policy is actually involved. Microsoft's copyright
defense was rejected when it failed to identify the presence of a
substantial copyright concern; it was accepted when it identified the
presence of a substantial copyright concern (as in the case of preserving
the integrity of the Windows user interface).
Bringing these three lines of cases together will give us a set of
objective standards for the antitrust/intellectual property interface. We
will recognize and give effect to the substantial concerns of intellectual
property laws, allowing those laws to trump antitrust law. But in
applying the intellectual property laws, we incorporate all of their
limitations, including the limits which we find in the misuse doctrines.
249. See Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 174 (1931) ("Where
domination exists, a pooling of competing process patents, or an exchange of licenses for the
purpose of curtailing the manufacture and supply of an unpatented product, is beyond the privileges
conferred by the patents and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. The lawful individual
monopolies granted by the patent statutes cannot be unitedly exercised to restrain competition.").
250. See supra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
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Because of the differences in patent and copyright misuse doctrines, this
will cause us to protect a wider range of behavior under the patent law
than under the copyright law.
XI.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT, ACADEMIC CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE
EMERGING SYNTHESIS

Intellectual property concerns and competition policy concerns
have come into contact in several lines of decisional and statutory law.
Over the years, these several strands have generated complexity and
apparent conflict. We, as a society, need an overall synthesis of antitrust,
patent, and copyright laws, including the differing misuse doctrines
attached to each of the latter. Yet most observers would be likely to say
that this task is too large to be achieved by the courts alone. When we
needed a reconciliation of patent misuse and patent infringement at midcentury, Congress provided that reconciliation.25 ' Congress has
subsequently stepped in to overrule or endorse particular judicial
decisions involving the intersection of intellectual property and
competition concerns. A priori, it would have seemed unlikely that the
needed synthesis of antitrust, patent, patent misuse, copyright, and
copyright misuse doctrines could be achieved at the present time by the
courts on their own. Indeed, the bringing of these several legal strands
into a coherent whole involves the acceptance of a new and broad
articulation of how the long-term objectives of our intellectual property
laws mesh with the short-and-long term objectives of our competition
policies. Especially in areas as complex as antitrust and intellectual
property, assistance from academic sources has sometimes been
necessary to enable the courts to take the large step necessary to achieve
the new perspective. That was the case in the 1970s when the judicial
approach to the antitrust laws moved to what has become known as the
"Chicago-School" approach. 2 That was also the case when the courts
adopted the prevailing approach to predatory pricing analysis. 3
Yet today the courts appear to be in the process of working out the
needed synthesis on their own. As shown above, the Federal Circuit has
25 1. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
252. On the role of academic input into the development of antitrust law, see Daniel J. Gifford,
The Jurisprudence of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1677, 1708 (1995). On the Chicago School
approach, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925 (1979).
253. The prevailing judicial approach to predatory pricing is that set forth by Harvard Law
School Professors Donald F. Turner and Philip Areeda in their seminal article Predatory Pricing
and Related PracticesUnder Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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come out strongly for an objective approach to reconciling antitrust and
intellectual property policies, an approach which accords controlling
effect to intellectual property within its own sphere. The Fourth, Fifth
and Ninth Circuits have imposed stringent limits on the use of
copyrights as mechanisms for effecting tying arrangements.2 4 And the
D.C. Circuit has required that substantial copyright concerns exist in the
particular fact settings in which a rights holder relies upon copyright to
effect market restraints that would otherwise implicate antitrust
scrutiny."' The several emphases of these different courts provide the
material for the new antitrust/intellectual property synthesis that is
emerging.
Although the courts have not followed the recommendations of the
academic commentators whose work we explored above, the work of
these commentators possesses an importance beyond its mere
contribution to the dialogue on the intellectual property/antitrust
interface. Our review of this work shows that all of these commentators
agreed that in its core area of application intellectual property rights
should trump antitrust concerns. This coincidence of academic policy
recommendations helps to confirm the soundness of the policy position
that the courts themselves are working out.
XII.

CONCLUSION

The courts, through lines of superficially conflicting cases, are in
fact evolving a new synthesis of antitrust law with patent and copyright
law. This new synthesis gives priority to the incentive structure of the
two intellectual property laws, but recognizes the lawfulness of a range
of behavior protected by patents that has no protected analogue under
copyright law. This aspect of the synthesis is grounded upon the
different roles that Congress has assigned to these two laws, as well as
upon judicial efforts over the decades to work out the implications of
these different roles in the respective caselaws of patent and copyright
misuse.

254. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.

